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Tools of Ignorance: An Appraisal of 
Deficiency Judgments 
Alan M. Weinberger 
Abstract 
While achieving success as a major league catcher, Mike 
Matheny was preparing for a post-baseball career in real estate 
development. He could not have picked a worse time to pursue his 
aspiration. Matheny lost his accumulated savings and his family’s 
home after being held personally liable for a $4.2 million 
deficiency judgment following foreclosure of property he was 
unable to develop or market during the Great Recession. 
Matheny’s failure to succeed in real estate was the proximate cause 
of his return to baseball as manager of the St. Louis Cardinals.  
Matheny’s story provides the backdrop for examining the 
methods by which deficiency judgments are calculated. The 
traditional common law approach has been criticized as unjust 
and overdue for reform. The most widely adopted variation, 
known as the “fair value” method, is hollow at its core. It provides 
no meaningful guidance to triers of fact charged with 
adjudicating value. This Article proposes a re-imagination of the 
method of calculating deficiency judgments based on experience in 
transactional practice and alternative dispute resolution. It seeks 
to accommodate the interests of borrowers and lenders, and the 
public interest in judicial efficiency and access to affordable 
credit. 
                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B. 1972, J.D. 
1975, University of Michigan. Since 2007 the Author has written Cases in Brief, 
a quarterly column for The Appraisal Journal, a publication of The Appraisal 
Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this Article do not necessarily 
represent those of The Appraisal Journal or its publisher. 
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I. Introduction 
The national pastime of baseball, perhaps more than any other 
sport,1 has a rich and colorful language.2 Baseball fans of a certain 
age will remember when announcers and color commentators used 
the phrase “tools of ignorance” to describe the catcher’s face mask, 
oversized mitt, chest protector, shin guards, and other padding and 
bumpering.3 The thought was that no sensible athlete would choose a 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“Baseball 
has been the national pastime for over one hundred years and enjoys a unique 
place in our American heritage.”). 
 2. See Sam Phillips, Corked Bats, Spitballs and Excessive Pine Tar 
(Ethical Issues in Baseball and the Law), PRECEDENT, Spring 2014, at 34, 35 
(arguing that baseball, “perhaps more than any other sport,” has a colorful 
language). Cases arising out of the baseball context tend to inspire colorful 
judicial rhetorical flourishes. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266–67 
(1972) (painting baseball as a “fine sport and profession, which brings surcease 
from daily travail and an escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this 
land”); Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc) (describing “the joy that comes with being close enough to the 
Great American Pastime to smell the new-mown grass, to hear the crack of 42 
inches of solid ash meeting a 95-mph fastball, or to watch a diving third 
baseman turn a heart-rending triple into a soul-soaring double-play”).  
 3. As used in the title of this Article, the phrase “tools of ignorance” is 
intended as a metaphorical critique of existing methods for calculating the size 
of deficiency judgments. Herold “Muddy” Ruel, a major league catcher for 
nineteen seasons, is credited with coining the phrase. See Chuck Rosciam, The 
Evolution of Catchers’ Equipment, BASEBALL RES. J. (2010), http://sabr.org/ 
research/evolution-catchers-equipment (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (noting that 
Ruel was “a backstop and a lawyer who caught for greats like Walter Johnson 
with the Washington Nationals in the 1920s”) (on file with the Washington and 
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position that required wearing an extra ten pounds of equipment and 
sitting in a crouch for nine innings during the dog days of summer.4 It 
was also a reminder that, by the premature end of his playing career, 
the typical major league catcher had broken most of the bones in both 
hands at least once and suffered post-concussion syndrome from foul 
balls, flying bats ricocheting off his mask, and collisions with base 
runners determined to reach home plate ahead of his tag.5 When it 
became apparent that the catcher’s position produces a 
disproportionate number of major league managers,6 the phrase fell 
into desuetude.  
                                                                                                     
Lee Law Review); Dan McGrath, Tough and Smart and Behind the Plate, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/sports/09 
cnccatchers.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (asserting that by calling his 
catcher’s gear by this title, Ruel was “thereby questioning his own sanity for 
subjecting his body to such pain and suffering”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 36 (“The legal profession tries to avoid 
ignorance altogether. Veteran lawyers, much like veteran ballplayers expected 
to perform jumping jacks in spring training, are required to attend MCLE 
programs.”).  
 5. See McGrath, supra note 3 (“[C]atching is still the toughest job on a 
baseball field—think foul tips and balls in the dirt, and having to squat while 
doing it . . . .”); Rosciam, supra note 3 (outlining the sources of pain endured by 
catchers, which ultimately led to the invention of catchers’ gear).  
 6. See Richard Schumann, Playing Background of Major League 
Managers, SABR RES. J. ARCHIVE, http://research.sabr.org/journals/playing-
background-of-major-league-managers (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (surveying the 
playing background of major league managers from 1901–1981 to show that, 
among major league managers who were former players, ex-catchers comprise a 
larger percentage (21.6%) than any other position) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). Of the thirty current managers in Major League 
Baseball, twelve were former catchers. See Doug Miller, Catchers Manage, All 
Right, MLB.COM (May 26, 2005), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/1063444/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Catchers are forced to watch a game the way a manager 
does . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Eleven 
broadcasters, including legendary play-by-play announcer Joe Garagiola and 
color commentator Tim McCarver, were former catchers. See McGrath, supra 
note 3 (arguing that the prevalence of catchers going on to become managers is 
largely because “[c]atching is . . . the toughest job on a baseball field” and “a 
catcher has to be the smartest player on the field”). An explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the catcher functions as an unofficial on-field member of the 
coaching staff, making decisions on every play. See Miller, supra, (“In essence, 
the catcher is running the game out there . . . .”). Although they comprise the 
largest percentage of managers who were former players, ex-catchers 
paradoxically have a lower winning percentage (.493) than managers who were 
former players in any other position. See Schumann, supra, (coming to this 
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Mike Matheny, four-time Gold Glove-winning catcher and 
manager of the St. Louis Cardinals since 2012, is the most recent 
example of this phenomenon.7 By the time he succeeded Tony La 
Russa as the Cardinals’ manager, Matheny had lost his personal 
fortune8 in the 2008 financial crash.9 Following a mortgage 
                                                                                                     
conclusion through examination of the “playing backgrounds of the 338 men 
who were major league managers between 1901 and 1981”). 
 7. Others include Yogi Berra (Yankees and Mets), Bruce Bochy (Giants), 
Ralph Houk (Yankees, Tigers, and Red Sox), Mike Scioscia (Angels), Jeff 
Torberg (multiple teams), and Joe Torre (Cardinals and Yankees).  
 8. Matheny earned a career salary of more than $18.5 million. See Joe 
Strauss, Matheny Says Financial Woes Helped Him Grow, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/columns/joe-
strauss/strauss-matheny-says-financial-woes-helped-him-grow/article_c7c0635a-
a679-5ea3-b0b2-121294d15e28.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 
Strauss, Matheny Says Financial Woes Help] (noting that, after the crash, “he 
and his family eventually were evicted from their West County home, unable 
even to take along keepsakes from Matheny’s playing career”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 9. The Great Recession began in December 2007 with the bursting of the 
housing bubble and subsequent mortgage market meltdown. See KATALINA M. 
BIANCO, CCH, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 2 (2008) (“The subprime mortgage crisis, popularly 
known as the ‘mortgage mess’ or ‘mortgage meltdown,’ came to the public’s 
attention when a steep rise in home foreclosures in 2006 spiraled seemingly out 
of control in 2007, triggering a national financial crisis that went global within 
the year.”). Securities backed by subprime mortgages (for example, mortgages 
based upon fraudulent appraisals and approved without documentation of 
borrowers’ income) led to both the housing boom and its collapse. See id. at 12 
(“As homeowners fell behind in their mortgage payments in ever-growing 
numbers, foreclosures continued to rise and interest rates rose to their highest 
level in years. These conditions left subprime lenders unable to finance new 
loans.”). In an effort to minimize their risk to originating lenders, subprime 
mortgages were packaged and sold to mutual funds, pension plans, and other 
investors. See id. at 8–9 (“Due to securitization, investor appetite for mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and the tendency of rating agencies to assign 
investment-grade ratings to MBS, loans with a high risk of default could be 
originated, packaged and the risk readily transferred to others.”). When the 
housing price bubble burst in 2008, mortgage-backed securities plunged in 
value, triggering a financial crisis that pushed the economy into the worst 
recession since the 1930s. See id. at 2 (noting that the financial crisis “went 
global within the year”). A worldwide tightening of credit paralyzed the housing 
and construction markets. See id. at 18 (“In late March 2008, it was reported 
that Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller index showed that U.S. home prices fell 
another 11.4 percent in January 2008, the housing market’s steepest drop since 
S&P started collecting data in 1987.”). The unemployment rate spiked to ten 
percent in October 2009, its highest level in thirty years. Economic Releases, 
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foreclosure of commercial property that he was unable to develop or 
market during the Great Recession,10 Matheny had been held 
personally liable for a $4.2 million deficiency judgment.11 His family 
                                                                                                     
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/ 
LNS14000000 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Venerable financial institutions like Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers failed. See BIANCO, supra (listing Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley as other large Wall Street investment banks that received 
reduced earnings due to the crisis). Municipal and state government budgets 
dependent on property tax revenues were squeezed. See generally id.; see also 
JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE 
REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 
(2014); Lawrence H. White, Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble, in 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR 
ECONOMIC FUTURE (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010). 
 10. See Jake Wagman & Jennifer Mann, Matheny Lost His Home in Legal 
Fight With Bank Over Business Debt, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/matheny-lost-his-home-in-
legal-fight-with-bank-over/article_5c9087aa-c1e7-5fb9-bc25-9f93f8e313c9.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (outlining Matheny’s failed real estate ventures) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See id. (“In May 2010, according to an affidavit from Business Bank, 
Matheny met with the bank and said the development partnership ‘was no 
longer going to make any further payments’ and that Matheny and his wife 
would not satisfy the $4.2 million they had vouched for.”). A deficiency judgment 
is a judgment rendered in favor of a creditor for the difference between the 
unpaid balance of a debt secured by a mortgage and, under the traditional 
common law approach, the amount paid by the high bidder at a public sale of 
the mortgaged property conducted for the satisfaction of that debt. See 
LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8:20 (2014) 
(defining a deficiency judgment as “an imposition of personal liability upon a 
mortgagor for an unpaid balance of a secured obligation after foreclosure of the 
mortgage has failed to yield the full amount of the underlying debt”). After 
obtaining a deficiency judgment, the lender is in a position as an unsecured 
creditor to levy against its debtor’s other assets to satisfy that personal 
judgment. See Robert H. Skilton, Assessing the Mortgage Debtor’s Personal 
Liability, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 442 (1942) (noting that the creditor can also levy 
against mortgaged premises). A deficiency judgment is obtained as part of the 
original proceeding following judicial foreclosure. See AHERN, supra, § 8:20, para. 
2 (“As an initial principle, the mortgagee can obtain a deficiency judgment after 
a judicial foreclosure, power-of-sale foreclosure, or even after a strict foreclosure, 
provided the local prerequisites for obtaining a deficiency judgment have been 
satisfied.”). Where foreclosure is by power-of-sale, the mortgagee obtains a 
deficiency judgment by filing a separate lawsuit against the mortgagor. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997) (delineating the process 
of an action for a deficiency).  
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had been evicted from their home and was living with his in-laws.12 
Matheny’s failure to succeed in real estate was the proximate cause of 
his return to major league baseball as a manager.13  
“Every lawsuit is a potential drama: a story of conflict, often with 
victims and villains, leading to justice done or denied.”14 Matheny’s is 
a haunting and cautionary tale for those who seek to parlay success 
in an unrelated field into a second career in real estate 
development.15 His experience will be painfully familiar to the 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Wagman & Mann, supra note 10 (adding that when Matheny 
discontinued payments he had told the lender that he had been making 
payments “at great expense to myself and my family”). As a player with the 
Cardinals in the early 2000s, Matheny built a 10,000 square foot, seventeen-
room house on eleven acres in the Saint Louis suburb of Wildwood, containing 
an indoor batting cage, four-car garage, five fireplaces, a home theater, a pool 
with a water slide, a private lake with a floating island golf green, and a 
treehouse wired for electricity. See id. (stating that the property was called a 
“mini-resort” in real estate listings). “A scoreboard next to a baseball diamond 
on the property bears the name ‘Field of Dreamers.’” Id. By 2010 the Mathenys 
were sharing his in-laws’ 2,500 square foot house in Chesterfield. See id. 
(outlining how the downfall of Matheny’s real estate business deal led to his 
family’s loss of everything). 
 13. See David Hunn, Financial Trials Hurt Matheny, But Also Brought 
Him Back to Cardinals, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/financial-trials-hurt-math 
eny-but-also-brought-him-back-to/article_7b3bd867-93b5-5c3e-99f4-bf18e7e03ce 
7.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“He wouldn’t be a manager now, he told the 
Post-Dispatch Friday, if he hadn’t lost it all on three lots in the Chesterfield 
Valley.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. Paul A. Lombardo, Legal Archaeology: Recovering the Stories Behind 
the Cases, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 589, 589 (2008). Although once a subject of 
controversy, the value of narrative in legal scholarship and education is no 
longer a matter of dispute. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2415 
(1989) 
Stories and counterstories, to be effective, must be or must 
appear to be noncoercive. They invite the reader to suspend 
judgment, listen for their point or message, and then decide 
what measure of truth they contain. . . . [T]hey offer a respite 
from the linear, coercive discourse that characterizes much 
legal writing. 
Jean C. Love, Commentary, The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship and 
Teaching, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87, 88, 92 (1998) (arguing that students 
learn from narratives in ways they cannot learn from objective analyses and 
traditional scholarly presentations).  
 15. The legacy project, a capstone to a successful career in an unrelated 
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transactional practice attorneys who represent clients engaged in one 
of the riskiest of businesses.16  
                                                                                                     
field, is a related phenomenon. Michael J. Fuchs, founder and former chairman 
of the board of Home Box Office, invested nearly $100 million of his own money 
and borrowed an additional $70 million from a syndicate of lenders, including 
the Bank of Hawaii, to develop sixty-five acres of coastal land in Hawaii for 
luxury housing, including amenities consisting of a 5.5 acre park with a 
freshwater pond, swimming pools, hula mound, jogging trail, and courts for 
basketball, tennis, and sand volleyball. Judging De Minimis: Does the Judge in 
Your Foreclosure Case Own Stock in the Bank Foreclosing on You?, DEADLY 
CLEAR (June 15, 2012), https://deadlyclear.wordpress.com/2012/06/15/does-the-
judge-in-your-foreclosure-case-own-stock-in-the-bank-foreclosing-on-you/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Judging De Minimis] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Fuchs was only able to sell fourteen of the 
fifty-nine-lot subdivision before the Hawaii real estate market collapsed in 2007. 
Id.; see also Agbannaoag v. Honorable Judges of the First Cir. Ct., Civ. No. 13-
00205 BMK, 2013 WL 5325053, at *5 (D. Haw. Sep. 20, 2013) (dismissing 
Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, without leave to amend, because “amending 
the Complaint in the manner proposed by Plaintiffs would not cure the 
deficiencies in the Complaint”). Fuchs defaulted on the loan in 2008. Judging De 
Minimis, supra. The lender initiated foreclosure proceedings in October 2009, 
which resulted in a $21.6 million deficiency for which Fuchs was held personally 
liable. Id. Fuchs subsequently filed a class action lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the arithmetical method for calculating deficiency judgments 
as a violation of Due Process. See Deficiency Judgments—Is Your Court a 
Collection Agency for Crooks? Class Action Filed in Hawaii, DEADLY CLEAR (Apr. 
29, 2013), https://deadlyclear.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/deficiency-judgments-is-
your-court-a-collection-agency-for-crooks-class-action-filed-in-hawaii/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (detailing the complaint for declaratory and injunctive 
relief brought by Fuchs and others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The court granted the lender’s motion to dismiss the complaint with 
prejudice on procedural grounds. See Agbannaoag, 2013 WL 5325053, at *1. The 
case has attracted considerable attention by reason of disclosures that Judge 
Bert I. Ayabe, who presided over the foreclosure proceedings, owned stock in the 
Bank of Hawaii through a custodial account controlled by his wife. See Judging 
De Minimis, supra, (asserting that the Judge refused to recuse himself although 
“$29,334 worth of stock invested in the bank is not considered de minimis to the 
average individual”). Penthouse Magazine publisher Robert Guccione is another 
example of this phenomenon. Guccione lost control of his company as a 
consequence of his obsessive quest to build a hotel casino on the boardwalk in 
Atlantic City. See Alan M. Weinberger, The Art of Breaking the Deal: The Case 
of the Penthouse Casino, 82 MISS. L. J. 651, 653 (2013) (describing the 
circumstances and events leading to Penthouse, the details of court proceedings, 
and the reasoning behind the appellate court’s reversal to present a “cautionary 
tale about professional responsibility in transactional practice”).  
 16. Transactional real estate practice deserves more attention than it 
receives in legal scholarship as it generates a greater proportion of legal 
malpractice claims than any other field (25%). William H. Gates, The Newest 
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Commercial real estate development is accomplished through the 
use of other people’s money, typically by borrowing from an 
institutional lender.17 By entering into a mortgage transaction, a 
property owner incurs a dual risk—the risk of loss of title to the 
property through foreclosure and the risk of personal liability for the 
deficiency in the event that the property sells at foreclosure for less 
than the remaining balance of the debt.18  
Deficiency judgments were a frequent consequence of 
foreclosures in the period following the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
when fully half of home mortgages went into default.19 Foreclosing 
mortgagees made nominal bids at auction sales at which there were 
few buyers at any price,20 acquired their borrowers’ properties, and 
claimed deficiency judgments for virtually the full amount of the 
debt.21 A rarity in subsequent decades,22 deficiency judgments 
                                                                                                     
Data on Lawyers’ Malpractice Claims, 70 A.B.A. J. 78, 84 (1984).  
 17. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 495–97 (6th ed. 2009) (providing an overview of the real estate 
development business, including how funding is achieved). 
 18. See Skilton, supra note 11, at 441–42 (describing, in detail, the double 
risk assumed by mortgage debtors). A commercial borrower may be able to 
protect against this latter risk by negotiating for a nonrecourse mortgage, 
whereby the borrower is exculpated from personal liability, although this is 
generally available only for post-construction loans secured by improved 
property that is already under lease. See id. (“Whatever may have been the 
circumstances, personal liability of an owner of mortgaged premises appears to 
be the rule and not the exception, and this risk will probably continue even after 
he has sold the premises to another, for it can only be terminated by novation, 
cancelation or satisfaction.”).  
 19. See David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage 
Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS REV. 569, 573 (2008), http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/ 
11/Wheelock.pdf (noting that, “[d]uring the Depression, several states enacted 
reforms that limited the rights of lenders to seek deficiency judgments against 
borrowers”). 
 20. See Skilton, supra note 11, at 444 (asserting that mortgagees’ presence 
at the auctions discouraged other potential buyers from participating because 
“[t]hey knew that the mortgagee would not permit his security to be sacrificed to 
bargain hunters”). 
 21. See 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE 
LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 12:69 (rev. ed. 1995) (noting that this outcome 
“resulted in a general perception that the foreclosure laws were unfair and in a 
proliferation of state antideficiency judgment legislation”). 
 22. See ANDRA GHENT, RESEARCH INST. HOUS. AM., THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE LAW 4, 32 (2012), http://www.housingamerica.org/ 
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returned with a vengeance to the dismay of investors like Matheny 
who borrowed to finance land development during the period before 
the bubble in property values, inflated by subprime mortgages, burst 
so spectacularly and unexpectedly in 2008.23 
Mike Matheny’s story provides a backdrop for examining the 
method of calculating deficiency judgments. Under traditional 
common law, a deficiency judgment is derived mechanically by 
subtracting the price for which the property sold at foreclosure, less 
the expenses of sale, from the outstanding mortgage indebtedness.24 
No consideration is given to evidence of higher property valuations.25 
                                                                                                     
RIHA/RIHA/Publications/82406_11922_RIHA_Origins_Report.pdf (explaining 
restrictions on deficiency judgments that arose during the Great Depression, 
presumptively leading to a decrease in these judgments in the following 
decades). Mortgage lenders seldom pursue deficiency judgments because they 
are unprofitable. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 21, § 12:2 n.3 
(“Unfortunately, the most recent study with respect to deficiency judgments was 
completed in 1958 . . . reveal[ing] that only a small dollar amount is ever 
realized in deficiency judgments by lenders.”). Most borrowers in foreclosure 
have few financial resources. According to a recent federal government study, 
the recovery rate on deficiency judgments was one-fifth of 1%. FHFA OFF. OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., AUD-2013-001, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF THE ENTERPRISES’ 
EFFORTS TO RECOVER LOSSES FROM FORECLOSURE SALES 15 (2012), 
http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2013-001.pdf. Deficiency judgments are 
“generally pursued only against investors, repeat defaulters, and nonhardship 
cases.” Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage 
Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 177–78 (2006) (quoting Charles A. Capone, 
Jr., Providing Alternatives to Mortgage Foreclosure: A Report to Congress, U.S. 
Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev. (1996)). Lenders recently have become more 
aggressive in pursuing deficiency judgments against so-called “strategic 
defaulters,” for example “someone who had the means but chose to go into 
default.” Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners 
Years After Foreclosure, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washington 
post.com/investigations/lenders-seek-court-actions-against-homeowners-years-
after-foreclosure/2013/06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc-11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. See BIANCO, supra note 9, at 12 (“By early January 2007, the United 
States’ subprime mortgage industry started to show signs of collapsing from 
higher-than-expected home foreclosure rates. As homeowners fell behind in 
their mortgage payments in ever-growing numbers, foreclosures continued to 
rise and interest rates rose to their highest level in years.”).  
 24. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The 
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1404–05 (2004) 
(comparing this traditional method of calculating deficiency judgments with 
contemporary “fair value” legislation). 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a (1997) 
(explaining the traditional method of calculating deficiency judgments, where 
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Nor does the borrower receive credit for a higher purchase price 
realized at a subsequent sale by the foreclosing mortgagee or its 
affiliate.26 The net foreclosure sale price determines conclusively the 
extent to which the value of the property is below the outstanding 
debt.27  
                                                                                                     
“the amount realized at the foreclosure sale is automatically applied to the 
mortgage obligation and . . . the mortgagee is entitled to a judgment for the 
balance”). Courts in states that follow the traditional common law grant 
exceptions only in cases when the mortgagor can prove that the foreclosure 
process was defective, or that the sale price was unconscionable or so 
inadequate as to raise an inference of fraud or unfair dealing. See, e.g., 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(explaining that Illinois law provides exceptions in the following circumstances: 
“(1) proper notice was not given; (2) the terms of the sale were unconscionable; 
(3) the sale was conducted fraudulently; or (4) justice was otherwise not done”). 
Missouri requires a sales price that both raises an inference of fraud and shocks 
the conscience. See In re Russell, No. 12-60190, 2013 WL 1868346, at *4 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. May 3, 2013) (noting that Missouri’s “shock the conscious” standard is 
“among the strictest in the country”). Applying this standard, Missouri courts 
have refused to set aside sales that resulted in prices that were only 20% to 30% 
of fair market value. See First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 
224 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (refusing to modify a sales price that was “barely more 
than 50 percent of the fair market” because the “lender gave cogent reasons for 
its lower bid due to the depressed real estate market and the bulk nature of the 
sale”). 
 26. See Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift From Power to Process: A Functional 
Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 79 n.9 (1996) (noting 
counterarguments that propose “[t]here is no reason to distinguish between 
profits realized on a resale and a surplus produced at a foreclosure sale” 
(quoting Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De 
Facto Strict Foreclosure—An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and 
Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 887 (1985))); Capital One, N. Am. v. 
Nicoll, 113 So. 3d 1158, 1161–62 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (2013) (“[D]efendant’s sole 
argument is that he is entitled to an extra credit . . . representing the gain 
realized by plaintiff from the sale of the property to a third party after the 
sheriff's sale. The law simply does not provide such a remedy for defendant.”). 
But see Reg’l Inv. Co. v. Willis, 572 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) 
(refusing to award $6,000 deficiency judgment to lender who bid $21,000 after 
having contracted to immediately resell foreclosed property for $29,000).  
 27. In theory, through the application of competitive market forces, the 
property’s fair market value will be realized by foreclosure, any equity in the 
property above the outstanding mortgage debt will be returned to the 
mortgagor, and, in the event the sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the 
debt, the sale price is used to establish the mortgagor’s deficit. See 9 GEORGE W. 
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 693–95 
(1958) (outlining the mortgagor’s equity). In practice, the dynamics of the open 
cry auction format penalizes borrowers by discouraging competitive bidding. See 
TOOLS OF IGNORANCE 839 
 
This arithmetical method for calculating deficiency judgments 
has come under attack by judges and commentators as unjust and 
overdue for reform.28 Even in a stable market, a forced sale normally 
                                                                                                     
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 cmt. a (1997) (“[B]ecause the 
mortgage lender can ‘credit bid’ up to the amount of the mortgage obligation 
without putting up new cash, it has a distinct bidding advantage over a 
potential third party bidder.”). Real estate does not trade freely in an auction 
market even under the best of circumstances. Foreclosure sales are not well 
attended. They are advertised in the classified columns of legal newspapers with 
limited circulation. The mortgagee is frequently not only the winning bidder but 
also the only bidder attending the sale. See id. § 8.3 cmt. a (explaining the 
“widely perceived dichotomy between ‘foreclosure sale value’ and fair market 
value”). The foreclosing mortgagee enjoys inherent advantages. It bids by way of 
a credit against the mortgage debt while other bidders are required to pay cash 
or its equivalent. See Roark v. Plaza Sav. Ass’n, 570 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978) (noting that the seller announced at the beginning of the auction 
that the “sale was for cash, which meant cash, cashier’s check or certified 
funds”). Most real estate buyers are unaccustomed to all-cash purchases. The 
mortgagee has an informational advantage over third-party purchasers having 
thoroughly evaluated the property as part of the loan underwriting process. A 
third-party purchaser must commit resources to due diligence without knowing 
its chances of being the high bidder. See Mashie Rapoport, New Jersey’s 
Balanced Mortgagor Protection Scheme, RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (Feb. 24, 
2014), http://www.rutgerspolicyjournal.org/new-jersey%E2%80%99s-bal anced-
mortgagor-protection-scheme (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (identifying problems 
present within the foreclosure process, which is “intended to ensure fairness to 
the mortgagor” but often lacks competition and “allows the mortgagee to behave 
opportunistically”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Potential 
bidders may find it difficult to inspect the premises prior to sale. Mortgagors 
who are about to lose their property through foreclosure understandably are 
reluctant to cooperate. As the party with the most to gain from increasing the 
purchase price, such behavior is self-destructive. But borrowers facing 
foreclosure may not be thinking clearly enough to act in their economic best 
interest. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 99 n.100 (“Unfortunately, either hope 
or despair colors the actions of the borrower who often does not participate in 
the foreclosure process.”). An auction sale is particularly ineffective during the 
periods of economic depression and collapsed real estate values in which large 
numbers of foreclosures occur. As a result, the lender will be the high bidder at 
an artificially low price in the vast majority of foreclosure sales. See Jennifer M. 
West & Daniel A. West, The New Face of Foreclosure in Missouri: A Look at 
Statutory Procedure and Both Statewide and National Trends Following the 
Great Recession, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Winter 2014, at 11 (noting, however, that the 
percentage of third party purchasers at foreclosures has increased recently). 
 28. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 81 
Courts and legislatures have constantly struggled to regulate the 
proper balance of power between lenders and borrowers . . . [and] 
have operated on the premise that if they could strike the proper 
balance, then property sold at a foreclosure sale would generate 
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will not yield a price that reflects the intrinsic value of property if it 
were marketed by an owner not under distress.29 During severe 
economic downturns, mortgaged property is sold “under the hammer” 
at substantially depressed prices.30  
In the wake of the Depression, states enacted remedial 
legislation to prevent perceived lending abuses and to moderate the 
economic dislocation caused by declining property values.31 Statutes 
circumscribing the ability of lenders to obtain deficiency judgments 
benefit some defaulting mortgagors but not without a tradeoff: The 
unintended consequences of Depression-era measures impose costs on 
a larger pool of borrowers by increasing the expense and reducing the 
supply of financing for land acquisition and development.32  
The most common form of debtor protection is the so-called “fair 
value” limitation on deficiency judgments.33 Embodied in statutes in 
many jurisdictions and the common law of others, the fair value 
approach is recommended by the Restatement of Property.34 While 
                                                                                                     
proceeds in the approximate amount of the property’s value. 
 29. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 24, at 1489 (“In many cases . . . the 
foreclosure sale does not result in any surplus. Instead, the proceeds fall short of 
satisfying the foreclosed obligation . . . .”). The United States Supreme Court has 
observed the price-suppressing tendency of the forced sale of property at 
foreclosure: “No one would pay as much to own such property as he would pay to 
own real estate that could be sold at leisure and pursuant to normal marketing 
techniques.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994). 
 30. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Carr, 13 F.3d 425, 430 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(holding, under the circumstances, that the petitioner failed to meet the burden 
of proof for bad faith when the sale price was merely inadequate). 
 31. See generally Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate 
Foreclosures in Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 MO. L. REV. 151 (1982); 
Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price 
Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843 (1980). 
 32. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 106 (“[A]nti-deficiency legislation 
inappropriately shifts the risk of market fluctuations from the owner to the 
lender, who must absorb losses but forgo gains in the value of the property. 
Efficiency and fairness dictate that the fluctuation of value must remain with 
the borrower as owner.”) 
 33. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 24, at 1491 (“[S]tates utilizing this 
statutory approach measure a deficiency judgment as the difference between the 
foreclosure price and the fair market value of the property.”). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a (1997) 
(stating that this approach protects the “unjust enrichment of the mortgagee” by 
preventing the “mortgagee purchasing the property at a deflated price, 
obtaining a deficiency judgment and, by reselling the real estate at a profit, 
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not prohibiting a lender from seeking a deficiency judgment, fair 
value limitation offers a more debtor-friendly alternative to the 
arithmetical method.35  
This Article argues that the Restatement approach is hollow 
at its core—the meaning of a fair value is vague, subjective, and 
unquantifiable.36 The statutory variation proposed in this 
Article is informed by experience in transactional practice and 
alternative dispute resolution.37 It would more fully involve 
appraisal professionals in a quasi-judicial capacity.38 By offering 
a more structured alternative to the Restatement, the proposal 
seeks to accommodate the interests of borrowers, lenders, and 
the public.39 
                                                                                                     
achieving a recovery that exceeds the obligation.”). The Restatement states in 
relevant part: 
§ 8.4 Foreclosure: Action For A Deficiency 
(a) If the foreclosure price is less than the unpaid balance of the 
mortgage obligation, an action may be brought to recover a 
deficiency judgment against any person who is personally 
liable on the mortgage obligation in accordance with the 
provisions of this section. 
(b) Subject to Subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the deficiency 
judgment is for the amount by which the mortgage obligation 
exceeds the foreclosure sale price. 
(c) Any person against whom such a recovery is sought may 
request in the proceeding in which the action for a deficiency is 
pending a determination of the fair market value of the real 
estate as of the date of the foreclosure sale. 
(d) If it is determined that the fair market value is greater than 
the foreclosure sale price, the persons against whom recovery 
of the deficiency is sought are entitled to an offset against the 
deficiency in the amount by which the fair market value . . . 
exceeds the sale price. 
Id. 
 35. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 24, at 1492–93 (using an example to 
demonstrate how the fair value approach “can result in a significantly reduced 
deficiency liability”). 
 36. Infra Parts III–IV. 
 37. See infra Part V and accompanying text (proposing a model statute). 
 38. Infra Part V. 
 39. Infra Part V. 
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II. The Toughest Man Alive 
Michael Scott Matheny grew up in Reynoldsburg, a suburb 
of Columbus, Ohio.40 He was drafted by the Milwaukee Brewers 
out of the University of Michigan, where he was co-captain of 
the baseball team.41  
Matheny was considered one of baseball’s best defensive 
catchers42 and a master of the psychology of handling 
pitchers.43 Over the course of thirteen seasons behind the plate, 
he earned the nicknames “Toughest Man Alive” and “Mad Dog 
Matheny” in recognition of his hard-nosed style of play.44 
                                                                                                     
 40. Willie Springer, Cardinals to Name Matheny as Manager, CBS ST. 
LOUIS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/11/13/cardinals-to-name-
matheny-as-manager/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 41. Mike Matheny #22, MLB.COM, http://stlouis.cardinals.mlb.com/team/ 
coach_staff_bio.jsp?c_id=stl&coachorstaffid=118414 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. He was adept at blocking balls in the dirt and throwing out base-
runners attempting to steal. He won the Rawling’s Gold Glove, awarded to the 
best defensive player in each position in 2000, 2003, and 2004 with the 
Cardinals, and in 2005 with the San Francisco Giants. Rick Hummel, Molina 
Wins Golden Glove Award, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/cardinal-beat/molina-wins-
gold-glove-award/article_8e723afe-04de-11e1-8202-001a4bcf6878.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (arguing that catcher Yadier Molina surpassed Matheny as 
the best defensive catcher in St. Louis Cardinal’s history after Molina won his 
fourth consecutive Gold Glove award in 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). He set major league records for catchers by playing in 252 
games without committing an error from August 1, 2002, to August 4, 2004, and 
by fielding 1,565 consecutive chances without an error in 2004. Matthew 
Jussim, Giants vs. Cardinals NLCS: St. Louis Manager Mike Matheny Proves 
Experience Is Overrated, SPORTS WORLD REP. (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.sportsworldreport.com/articles/5820/20121017/giants-vs-cardinals-
nlcs-st-louis-manager-mike-matheny-proves-experience-is-overrated-
commentary.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 43. See Tim McKernan, Mike Matheny: From InsideSTL to Cardinal 
Manager, INSIDESTL.COM (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.insidestl.com/ 
insideSTLcom/McKernan/tabid/61/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/7784/Mike-
Matheny-From-insideSTL-To-Cardinal-Manager.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(“He knew some guys needed to be yelled at (like Matt Morris), and he knew 
that some guys needed to be handled differently (like Garrett Stephenson).”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44.  See Joshua Cooley, Matheny’s Mission, FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN 
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Suffering from the effects of post-concussion syndrome,45 
Matheny retired from baseball in 2007 with one year remaining 
on his contract.46 
As the Cardinals’ choice to succeed Hall of Fame manager Tony 
La Russa in 2012,47 Matheny was initially greeted with skepticism.48 
                                                                                                     
ATHLETES (May 1, 2014), http://www.fca.org/themagazine/mathenys-
mission/#.VNLVHdLF_JA (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (telling the story of how 
Matheny received the nickname “Mad Dog”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Daniel Wasserman, Trading in Blue for Gold: Mike Matheny’s 
Path to and from Michigan, MICH. DAILY (June 5, 2011), http://www. 
michigandaily.com/sports/trading-blue-gold-mike-mathenys-path-and-michigan 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Matheny’s nickname “Toughest Man Alive”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). After being struck squarely 
in the face by a ninety-five mile-per-hour fastball during an at-bat in 1998, 
Matheny caught an entire ten-inning game the next day with a puffy face and a 
couple of missing teeth. See Dom Cosentino, That Time Mike Matheny Took a 
Fastball To The Face And Barely Flinched, DEADSPIN (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://deadspin.com/that-time-mike-matheny-took-a-fastball-to-the-face-and-
1451042467 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (stating that after Matheny was struck in 
the face, “[h]e did nothing but lean on his bat and put his hand on his hip”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 45. See Concussion Symptoms Force Matheny to Retire, ESPN (Feb. 1, 
2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2751419 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (stating that, after Matheny underwent multiple tests as part of a sports 
concussion program, “he experienced the same troublesome symptoms for a day 
and a half, such as fatigue, memory problems, and a tough time focusing and 
seeing straight”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Matheny 
says he has no lingering symptoms from the twenty-five to thirty concussions he 
suffered in his life. Cooley, supra note 44. 
 46. See id. (“Mike Matheny’s decision to retire was made for him. His 
doctor refused to clear the longtime catcher to play in 2007 after a concussion 
sidelined him for the final four months of last season.”).  
 47. See Joe Strauss, Cards Retiring La Russa’s No. 10, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 2, 1012), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/ 
cards-retiring-la-russa-s-no/article_26116bcf-ebef-5224-ba8f-ae3ff3b30064.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (quoting Chairman Bill DeWitt Jr., “Tony’s 
managerial tenure with the Cardinals will always stand out as one of the 
greatest eras in Cardinal history”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 48. See Strauss, Matheny Says Financial Woes Help, supra note 8 (“During 
an autograph-signing . . . a woman approached to tell [Matheny], ‘I thought they 
were crazy for hiring you, but I guess it’s going OK.’”). Matheny himself 
described his hiring as a “parting-of-the-Red-Sea, walking-on-water type of 
miracle.” Cooley, supra note 44. At the time of his selection, Matheny was the 
youngest manager in major league baseball. Id. He had no prior full-time 
professional coaching experience in any capacity. See Jena McGregor, The 
Leadership Smarts of Cardinals Manager Mike Matheny, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 
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Now considered among the top echelon of active major league 
managers,49 Matheny is one of only five managers in baseball history 
to lead a major league team to the postseason in each of his first three 
seasons as manager.50  
Matheny prepared for his new role by reading books about 
leadership and consulting with captains of industry.51 His study of 
the subject led Matheny to adopt the so-called “servant leadership” 
model, a nonhierarchical organizational structure where the pyramid 
is flipped upside down.52 Characterized by humility and loyalty, 
servant-leadership is a concept that suits Matheny’s personality,53  
                                                                                                     
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-leadership/ wp/2013/10/25/the-
leadership-smarts-of-cardinals-manager-mike-matheny/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (asserting that Matheny had, however, previously served as an adviser for 
the Cardinals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 49. See The Best Current MLB Managers, RANKER, http://www. 
ranker.com/list/best-current-mlb-managers/ranker-baseball (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (ranking Matheny as the fifth best MLB manager) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). “He’s a rock star in the heartland and 
revered around the game for his humble leadership qualities.” Cooley, supra 
note 44.  
 50. See THE ESPN BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1672, 1673, 1675 (Gary Gillette 
& Pete Palmer eds., 4th ed. 2007) (listing the other managers: Larry Dierker, 
Astros, 1997–1999; Ron Gardenhire, Twins, 2002–2004; Ralph Houk, Yankees, 
1961–1963; and Hughie Jennings, Tigers, 1907–1909). 
 51. See Eric Nusbaum, Mike Matheny, Little League, and Baseball 
Fundamentalism, VICE SPORTS (July 24, 2014), https://sports. 
vice.com/article/mike-matheny-little-league-and-baseball-fundamentalism (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing Matheny’s fundamentalist approach to 
baseball) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 52. See Jenifer Langosch, Matheny’s Selfless Approach A Perfect Fit For 
Cardinals, MLB.COM (Sept. 29, 2013), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article/mlb/st-
louis-manager-mike-matheny-has-made-a-point-to-put-his-players-ahead-of-
himself-and-theyveresponded?ymd=20130929&content_id=62025156&vkey= 
news_mlb (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“[H]e consumed himself in learning more 
about a servant-leadership model that had long intrigued him.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See Cooley, supra note 44 (noting that Matheny is active in the 
Fellowship of Christian Athletes); Daniel Wasserman, supra note 44 (quoting a 
fellow teammate as saying, “Off the field, he taught me to be a man and a 
respectful person”). Matheny credits his religious faith with influencing his 
business and coaching philosophy. See Cooley, supra note 44 (“I always felt I 
had the responsibility to be an example of how Christians ought to compete.”). A 
year after retiring as a player, Matheny agreed to coach his son’s little league 
team, the TPX Warriors. See id. (describing Matheny’s transition to Little 
League coaching). During a flight from New York to St. Louis in 2009, Matheny 
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and one that he finds familiar.54  
Matheny was already preparing for life after baseball while still 
an active player, including real estate correspondence course work 
during road trips.55 He has acknowledged being thrilled by the 
                                                                                                     
took out his laptop and wrote from scratch a five-page letter to parents of team 
members describing his coaching philosophy and expectations. See id. (“Mike 
was asked to coach a youth baseball team and wrote a series of conditions he 
demanded before agreeing to be with the team.”). It went viral after being 
posted online and has become known as “The Matheny Manifesto.” See id. 
(describing how the document was “quickly shared virally across the country”); 
see also Mike Matheny, The Matheny Manifesto (2009) [hereinafter The Matheny 
Manifesto], www.mikematheny.com/sites/default/files/docs/MathenyManifesto. 
pdf (describing his coaching philosophy and directing parents to remain 
interested but civil). It describes Matheny’s vision of a team without parental 
intrusion and a distinctly faith-based emphasis on character development. See 
id. (explaining that Matheny’s vision of a baseball experience with these unique 
characteristics “is a great opportunity for these boys to grow together and learn 
some lessons that will go beyond their baseball experience”). It instructs parents 
to watch games silently, limiting themselves to clapping, because even shouting 
encouragement puts too much pressure on their children. See The Matheny 
Manifesto, supra, at 1 (directing parents to “be a silent source of 
encouragement” for their player). Players are instructed never to question 
authority figures, either coaches or umpires. See id. at 2 (forbidding the boys 
from showing any emotion against the umpire). Parents were required to read 
and sign the letter. See id. at 5 (“Let me know as soon as possible whether or not 
this is a commitment that you and your son want to make.”). It concluded by 
noting that it “may not be the right fit” for everyone, and some parents declined 
to sign after reading it. Id. at 5. Matheny makes no apology for the Christian 
influence, and players of all denominations are welcome on the Warriors, 
although “potential coaches must make a testimony of faith.” See id. at 1 
(admitting that his Christian faith serves as a guide for his life); Derrick Goold, 
Matheny’s “Manifesto” Changes Tone of Youth Baseball, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Sept. 24, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/ 
professional/matheny-s-manifesto-changes-tone-of-youth-baseball/article_c80de 
770-9e5f-55c2-888c-f6f4a9b85baa.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (describing 
how players had to perform a “character study” at each practice) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 54. See Langosch, supra note 52 (“‘It struck me that I had done some of this 
as a leader in a catching role,’ Matheny said . . . ‘My whole point of being in that 
uniform was to make my pitchers’ job easier and to make them better.’”). 
 55. See David Hunn & Derrick Goold, Cardinals Manager Mike Matheny 
Owes Millions After Losing Legal Fight, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2013, 
12:05 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/cardinals-manager-mike-
matheny-owes-millions-after-losing-legal-fight/article_0acb85ad-508c-5007-
a4c4-b014a052a404.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (describing Matheny’s 
venture into real estate while he still played as an attempt to expand his career 
beyond baseball) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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challenge of chasing real estate deals, in which he experienced early 
success.56 In September 2005, Matheny formed MPD Investments, 
L.L.C. (MPD) with former St. Louis indoor soccer players Brett 
Phillips and Daryl Doran, a neighbor of Matheny’s.57 The entity 
bought and quickly resold a block in the WingHaven development in 
St. Charles, Missouri, realizing a $2.4 million profit in six months.58 
As Matheny described the market before 2008, “You could throw a 
dart at any kind of real estate and you were going to do well.”59  
Matheny could not have picked a worse time to begin a second 
career in real estate. The greatest financial downturn since the Great 
Depression suddenly appeared, seemingly out of nowhere,60 in mid-
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.61 Real property of all kinds experienced 
dramatic declines in value.62 A wave of foreclosures disrupted the 
lives of millions of borrowers, including Mike Matheny’s.63 Following 
an historical digression in Part III of this Article,64 Part IV discusses 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. (describing Matheny’s various real estate ventures, including 
acquiring large plots of land in central Illinois, Missouri, West Virginia, Ohio, 
and an interest in a Long Island real estate project).  
 57. See id. (describing the formation of MPD). 
 58. See Wagman & Mann, supra note 12 (“The trio bought a block at the 
WingHaven development in St. Charles and flipped it in six months, Doran said 
in an interview.”). 
 59. Strauss, Matheny Says Financial Woes Help, supra note 8. 
 60. See Gary Becker, The Subprime Housing Crisis, THE BECKER-POSNER 
BLOG (Dec. 23, 2007, 3:24 PM), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2007/12 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“The vast majority of 
economists, including me, were surprised by the extent of the subprime 
mortgage crisis.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61. See TAUB, supra note 9, at 247 (describing how “Lehman, one of the 
oldest investment houses in the country” was the largest bankruptcy filing in 
American history). 
 62. See id. at 257 (pointing to the irony of Senator Richard Durbin 
speaking on the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act while homeowners’ 
houses’ worth continued to decline). 
 63. See Strauss, Matheny Says Financial Woes Help, supra note 8 (“The 
last six years have taken turns with Matheny, threatening to bankrupt him, 
evicting him, challenging him, and ultimately providing an opportunity he 
would have rejected if not for the tribulations preceding it.”); TAUB, supra note 
9, at 282 (noting that, since the “burst of the bubble,” about five million homes 
have experienced foreclosure with millions more underway). 
 64. See infra Part III (discussing the history of foreclosure and deficiency 
judgments). 
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Matheny’s brief career in real estate and how it led to his return to 
baseball as a manager.65 
III. An Historical Digression 
The introduction of foreclosure in seventeenth century England 
was a remarkable innovation in the history of jurisprudence, and the 
most significant reform in the evolution of land finance law.66 It is 
ironic that the modern cause of action for a deficiency judgment, 
unknown to early English common law,67 was an unintended 
consequence of that reform.  
The Anglo-American mortgage originated as a device to 
circumvent the biblical prohibitions against usury.68 
Landowners could not borrow money and pay interest in a 
straightforward mortgage transaction.69 This presented a 
challenge for lenders seeking to earn a profit from lending 
money in a form that would not be deemed interest.70 Christian 
                                                                                                     
 65. See infra Part IV (documenting Matheny’s brief real estate venture 
career and his return to the Cardinals as manager). 
 66. See 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN COMMON LAW 159 
(Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1896) (identifying the court of equity’s 
creation of foreclosure as “one of the most splendid instances in the history of 
our jurisprudence”). 
 67. See John L. Tierney, “Fair” Value and the Deficiency Judgment, 16 J. 
LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 181, 181 (1940) (“The deficiency judgment problem 
resulting from the foreclosure sale of property for less than the balance due on 
the mortgage was a perplexing phenomenon of the drastic decline in realty 
prices during the period from 1929 to 1934.”). 
 68. See Leviticus 25:36 to 25:37 (New International Version) (“Do not take 
interest or any profit from them, but fear your God, so that they may continue to 
live among you. You must not lend them money at interest or sell them food at a 
profit.”); Deuteronomy 23:20 to 23:21 (forbidding charging fellow Israelites 
interest); Luke 6:35 (instructing to lend to your enemies without expecting to get 
anything back). 
 69. See 18 TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, MISSOURI PRACTICE, REAL ESTATE LAW—
TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES § 13:1 (3d ed. 2006) (describing how modern 
mortgages still grant an absolute right in real property subject to the mortgage 
lien, a practice similar to the ancient one forbidding usurious transactions). 
 70. See ANDRA GHENT, THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE 
LAWS 11 (2012) (pointing out how, in medieval England, the most common form 
of mortgage consisted of the lender receiving the rents and profits from the land 
to satisfy the debt to avoid the appearance of a usurious transaction). Usury was 
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lenders believed it was necessary to take possession of the land 
to collect income from rents and profits.71 A loan transaction 
thus necessarily involved not only the transfer of title to the 
property from the borrower to the lender but also the transfer of 
possession.72  
Jewish law did not require creditors to possess the land.73 
Accordingly, for hundreds of years until the thirteenth century, 
borrowers found it comparatively more advantageous to transact 
with Jewish lenders.74 Their superior product became 
unavailable when Edward I banished the Jews from England in 
1290.75  
By the fifteenth century, the common law of estates and 
future interests had sufficiently evolved to create the “modern” 
mortgage in the form of a fee simple subject to condition 
subsequent.76 The property owner conveyed defeasible title to the 
                                                                                                     
punishable by excommunication or other censure by the ecclesiastical courts 
during the medieval period. In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 171, 174 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1980) (“[D]uring the medieval period fear of excommunication or other 
censure by the ecclesiastical courts was a greater deterrent than was the civil 
penalty of confiscation of all of the property of the usurer . . . .”). 
 71. See 9 JOHN S. GRIMES, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 693 (1958) (“The pious Christian lender was forced to take possession 
of the property so that he could reap the rents and issues as recompense for his 
money lent.”). 
 72. See TRYNIECKI, supra note 69, § 13:1 (highlighting the similarities 
between how modern mortgages grant an absolute right in real property subject 
to the mortgage lien and the similar ancient practice). 
 73. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 3, at 6 (2d ed. 1970) (delineating 
Jewish law from other ancient laws in that, when dealing with a Jewish lender, 
“the creditor did not take possession”). 
 74. See id. (noting that, because of the favorable Jewish practices, “there 
developed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a gage of lands and tenements 
confined exclusively to Jewish creditors”). 
 75. See id. (reporting that the benefits of Jewish lenders became “obsolete” 
with the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290). 
 76. See THOMAS LITTLETON, LITTLETON ON MORTGAGES § 332, quoted in 
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 606 (5th ed. 
1956) (describing the origin of the word “mortgage” as an amalgam of the 
French word for “dead” and an Anglo–Saxon term, “gage,” that roughly 
translates as “pledge”). According to a leading authority on the history of the 
law of property, the device was called a “mortgage” because “it is doubtful 
whether the [borrower] will pay . . . ; and if he doth not pay, then the land which 
is put in pledge upon condition for the payment of the money is taken from him 
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lender, subject to the condition subsequent that would revest title 
in the borrower on repayment of the debt.77  
Creditors would lend no more than they thought the land 
was worth or would be worth at the end of the term of the loan.78 
Because the length of a typical mortgage loan was only six 
months,79 the risk that the property might decline in value was 
minimal. There was no personal liability on the part of the 
borrower if the value of the land happened to be less than the 
amount of the debt, nor was there any surplus payable to the 
borrower if the value of the land exceeded the debt.80 
Time was of the essence for mortgages prior to the 
seventeenth century.81 Payment was required to be made on one 
day, and one day only, known as “Law Day.”82 There was no right 
to prepay.83 A mortgagor who failed to repay the indebtedness 
during regular business hours on the appointed day for any 
reason forfeited all interest in the mortgaged premises to the 
mortgagee, a process that came to be known as strict 
foreclosure.84 Regardless of how much of the debt had been 
                                                                                                     
forever, and so dead to him . . . . And if he doth pay the money, then the pledge 
is dead as to the [lender].” Id. 
 77. See Lawrence G. Preble & David W. Cartwright, Convertible and 
Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging the Equity of Redemption, 20 REAL 
PROP. & TR. J. 821, 823 (1985) (“The borrower conveyed seisin and a deed to the 
lender, subject to a condition subsequent which would revest seisin in the 
borrower upon repayment of the debt.”). 
 78. See In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 171, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(“It would appear that in the early gages the value of the land was roughly the 
equivalent of the amount of the debt.”). 
 79. See Mendes Hershman, Introduction to 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY 
R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING, at xxviii 
(rev. ed. 1995) (describing the historical length of a typical mortgage loan). 
 80. See In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. at 176 (noting the lack of 
personal liability on the part of the borrower). 
 81. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 
§ 1.2, at 8 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasizing the importance of timeliness in 17th 
century mortgage practices). 
 82. See KENT, supra note 66, at 188 (identifying Law Day as payment day). 
 83. See Alan M. Weinberger, Neither an Early Nor a Late Payor Be—
Presuming to Question the Presumption Against Mortgage Prepayment, 35 
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (reaffirming the traditional view that, unless 
expressly granted in an agreement, borrowers do not have the right to prepay). 
 84. See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 857 n.43 (describing how the term 
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repaid, a borrower who failed to discharge the obligation in full 
on Law Day lost title to the entire property.85 These rules were 
strictly enforced by the courts of law.86 
The deficiency judgment was unknown to early foreclosure 
practice.87 Strict foreclosure meant that the mortgagee took title 
to the property in full satisfaction of the debt.88 Not until the 
eighteenth century would it become the rule that, if the value of 
the land was insufficient to fully compensate the lender, it might 
maintain an action at law for the balance as a personal obligation 
of the mortgagor after foreclosure.89 
Forfeiture of title was repugnant to the notion of equity. By 
the seventeenth century the English Courts of Chancery began to 
intervene to protect borrowers against forfeiture resulting from 
harsh common law rules.90 Chancellors created exceptions in 
                                                                                                     
“strict foreclosure” originated in the United States in the early eighteenth 
century). 
 85. See Preble & Cartwright, supra note 77, at 823 (recognizing that 
default by the borrower on Law Day destroyed the borrower’s right to the 
property entirely, giving title to the lender). 
 86. See id. (noting that the courts of law strictly enforced property laws).  
 87. See Harold C. Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure—
Possibilities Suggested by Honeyman v. Jacobs, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 958 (1940) 
(pointing out the noted absence of the deficiency judgment from the early law of 
mortgages and describing its development in later foreclosure practice). 
 88. See KENT, supra note 66, at 181 (noting that, when strict foreclosure is 
practiced, the creditor takes the estate for himself). 
 89. See Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562, 56263 (1793) (“A mortgagee, 
who has entered for condition broken, may afterwards have an action upon the 
bond, and he will recover the difference between the value of the bond, and the 
amount of principal and interest on the bond.”). The size of the deficiency was 
ascertained by estimate based on proof of the value of the property. See id. at 
563 (describing the calculation of the deficiency); see also Vaughan, supra note 
87, at 965 (calculating the deficiency based on reports from appraisers of the 
value of the property at issue); Tierney, supra note 67, at 182 n.11 (noting that 
the practice of a mortgagee suing for the deficiency after a foreclosure sale 
became a rule of law early on); In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 171, 176 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (“At the outset a creditor would lend no more than he 
thought that the land was worth, or would be worth at the end of the agreed 
term.”). 
 90. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 619 (7th ed. 2010) (describing 
how “the courts stepped in to protect borrowers from overreaching lenders”). 
Use of the term “equity” to describe the extent to which the fair market value of 
the property exceeds the amount of indebtedness secured by the property and, 
therefore, the net value of a borrower’s ownership interest, “pays linguistic 
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cases of accident, mistake, and special hardship.91 Soon courts 
were routinely granting equitable relief, compelling mortgagees 
to reconvey property to mortgagors upon repayment of the 
principal, with interest and costs, even if Law Day had long since 
passed.92  
As a consequence of the creation of the borrower’s equity of 
redemption, a lender’s title was clouded (or rendered 
unmarketable) for an indefinite period of time by the possibility 
that a defaulting borrower might seek and obtain relief in equity 
notwithstanding the terms of the mortgage.93 It was impossible 
for a lender to know with any degree of certainty when or 
whether it would be free to use or sell the land.94 Accordingly, 
lenders were given the right to petition for a decree of foreclosure, 
meaning that the chancery court would set a certain date for 
when their borrowers’ equity of redemption would finally 
terminate if the default persisted.95 Cutting off the equity of 
redemption granted indefeasible title to the mortgaged property 
to the mortgagee, regardless of the value of the property in 
                                                                                                     
homage to the generations of chancellors who have been moved to protect 
debtors from overreaching moneylenders.” Id. at 618. 
 91. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 29, at 2829 (1836) (noting the ability 
of Courts of Chancery to create exceptions to forfeiture of title and generally 
describing the role of the courts of equity in mortgage law). 
 92. See CHARLES HARPUM, ET AL., MEGGARY & WADE: THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 1172 (6th ed. 2000) (describing the intervention of the courts of equity 
in regulating mortgages and foreclosures). 
 93. See id. at 1173 (noting the ambiguity of the lender’s situation as he 
waited for a borrower to seek or not seek relief in equity). 
 94. See Preble & Cartwright, supra note 77, at 824 (summarizing the plight 
of unpredictability of the lender after the arrival of the equity of redemption as 
an option for the borrower). 
 95. See 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 33132 (3d ed. 
1927) (describing the lenders’ inevitable response—a waiver of the equity of 
redemption as a standard provision in mortgages). The chancery courts 
responded to these attempts to circumvent equitable jurisdiction by creating a 
prohibition against contemporaneous clogging of the equity of redemption. See 
Preble & Cartwright, supra note 77, at 824 (“In essence, the clogging doctrine 
restricted the lender to only one method of cutting off the borrower’s equity of 
redemption—foreclosure.”). Foreclosure thus became the only method for 
extinguishing the mortgagor’s equity of redemption. See id. (documenting the 
courts’ limits on lenders’ remedies to counteract the borrowers’ equity of 
redemption). 
852 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829 (2015) 
 
relation to the outstanding indebtedness. The only effect of 
foreclosure was to terminate the mortgagor’s right of redemption: 
“It did not cause a sale of the property, and it did not establish a 
deficiency.”96 
The unfairness of strict foreclosure would later be mitigated 
by providing for open cry public auction of the mortgaged 
property to the highest bidder, either as a result of a judicial 
proceeding or under a power-of-sale contained in the mortgage.97 
The foreclosure sale price, net of expenses, provided the basis for 
an unsatisfied lender to pursue the borrower for a deficiency.98 
The movement away from strict foreclosure and toward public 
sale was surely not intended to affect the debtor adversely.99 The 
                                                                                                     
 96. See In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 171, 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). 
 97. See Kasey Curtis, The Burst Bubble: Revisiting Foreclosure Law in 
Light of the Collapse of the Housing Industry, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 123 
(2008) (“Not surprisingly, strict foreclosure has been viewed as unduly harsh 
and modern jurisdictions have abandoned strict foreclosure in favor of methods 
that result in a judicial sale rather than forfeiture.”). All states allow 
mortgagees to file a civil action seeking judicial foreclosure. See id. (“Judicial 
foreclosure is the only method used in every state, and is the predominate 
method in about half of the states.”). If the court finds that the mortgagor has 
defaulted under the terms of the loan, the court will order that the property be 
sold at a public foreclosure sale. See id. (pointing out that auction sales are the 
end result of both judicial foreclosures and foreclosures by power-of-sale). If the 
mortgagor fails to exercise the right of redemption prior to the sale of the 
property, the collateral will be sold to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. 
See id. (describing how a public auction operates following a foreclosure). The 
purchaser takes title to the property free of any liens, or other interests or 
encumbrances, subordinate to the foreclosed mortgage. See id. (noting that, 
after an auction, the winning purchaser receives unencumbered title to the 
foreclosed property). About half the states by statute permit power-of-sale 
foreclosure as an alternative to judicial foreclosure if the mortgage contains a 
power-of-sale clause. See id. at 124 (indicating that nearly sixty percent of states 
permit power-of-sale foreclosure as a more efficient method of foreclosure). The 
ability to foreclose without resorting to a judicial proceeding is comparatively 
more advantageous to mortgagees in terms of time and expense. See id. at 123 
(describing the procedures for a power-of-sale foreclosure, which eliminate many 
of the required formalities in a judicial foreclosure). 
 98. See id. (“If, however, the amount of debt exceeds the value of the 
property, the mortgagor can still be held liable for the difference.”). 
 99. See Skilton, supra note 11, at 443 
It was probably assumed that, at the time of the sale, the property 
would usually bring more than the mortgage. The assumption was 
doubtless well founded in a period of rising land values; but the 
technique did not afford sufficient protection to the debtor in 
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modern cause of action for a deficiency judgment was an 
unintended consequence of foreclosure-process reform designed to 
relieve debtors from the harshness of strict foreclosure.  
During the Great Depression, as mortgages went into 
default, third parties had little money to purchase property at 
foreclosure sales.100 The absence of competition enabled 
mortgagees to behave opportunistically by bidding a nominal 
amount, obtaining title to the property for a small percentage of 
its fair market value, and then seeking a judgment for the 
artificially high difference between the purchase price and the 
remaining amount of the debt.101 When market conditions 
stabilized, lenders were able to resell foreclosed property at a 
profit, for which the borrower did not receive credit.102 Lenders 
realized what amounted to a windfall because the double recovery 
collectively exceeded the mortgagee’s debt.103 Borrowers suffered 
not only the loss of title to their property but also liability for a 
substantial deficiency.104  
Measures for the relief of debtors are the inevitable 
byproduct of depression periods in which large numbers of 
foreclosures occur, eliciting the concern of voters and 
legislators.105 To counter unjust enrichment of mortgage lenders 
                                                                                                     
depression times . . . In these times, the technique of sale made bad 
matters worse for the debtor. 
Of course, foreclosures were more common during times of declining real estate 
values. See id. (highlighting how times of economic depression generally cause 
the number of foreclosures to increase). 
 100. See Catherine A. Gnatek, Note, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Law: 
Redemption and Reinstatement, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 478 (describing the 
influence that the Great Depression had on mortgage and foreclosure law, as 
foreclosure sale prices plummeted while potential purchasers had very little 
money). 
 101. See id. (asserting that this opportunistic behavior “results in great 
unfairness to the mortgagor” which was “magnified by the Great Depression”). 
 102. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 104 (noting that the Great Depression 
caused legislatures to seek solutions to help borrowers). 
 103. See Rapoport, supra note 27 (using an example to illustrate how 
lenders potentially realize a windfall before statutory help to borrowers existed). 
 104. See Gnatek, supra note 100, at 478 (pointing out the large discrepancy 
between the benefit to lenders during the Great Depression and the losses of 
borrowers during the same time period). 
 105. See Skilton, supra note 11, at 440 (stating that, during these depression 
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and the oppressive effect of economic conditions on borrowers, 
many states codified protections in the form of statutory rights of 
redemption, anti-deficiency statutes, and fair value legislation.106  
Statutory rights of redemption exist in approximately three-
fifths of the states.107 They afford mortgagors a second 
opportunity to redeem, and thereby avoid the loss of title to the 
property, during a specified period following the foreclosure 
sale.108 Most of these statutes permit mortgagors to remain in 
possession during the redemption period.109 The period of time 
during which mortgagors may exercise their statutory right of 
redemption ranges from three months to two years after the 
sale.110 Allowing mortgagors to remain in possession during the 
redemption period eases the disruption of foreclosure, especially 
in states that permit power-of-sale foreclosure, which may be 
accomplished in a matter of weeks.111 Statutory redemption 
                                                                                                     
periods, “an increasing class of unfortunate people assumes a position of 
influence in government”). 
 106. See id. (reiterating that depression periods incentivized legislators to pay 
attention to the distressing position of the mortgage debtor). Many states enacted 
temporary moratoria on foreclosures. See id. (contrasting federal and state 
legislatures’ actions and responses to the poor position of the debtor). These 
statutes were designed to give debtors an opportunity to refinance once market 
conditions stabilized or, at least, delay foreclosure until the economy improved 
with the passage of time and competitive bidding might be expected to resume. 
See id. (“Many state legislatures, in an effort to break the wave of liquidation and 
afford property owners an opportunity to refinance, passed moratoria.”). The 
constitutionality of moratoria statutes was upheld in Home Building & Loan Ass’n 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Most of these statutes expired by their own 
terms or by additional legislation after the Depression ended. See DAVID S. HILL, 
BASIC MORTGAGE LAW 267 (2001) (noting the short-term nature of the moratoria 
statutes). 
 107. See Rapoport, supra note 27, at n.46 (listing the twenty-nine states that 
allow the statutory right of redemption). 
 108. See id. (describing how the statutory right of redemption provides 
protection to borrowers by giving them one last chance to reacquire their homes). 
 109. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 101.07(c)(1), at 469 (David A. Thomas 
ed., 1994) (“[T]he debtor is invariably allowed to continue to occupy the property 
during the redemption period.”). 
 110. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-103 (2014) (proscribing a three-month 
redemption period), with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-52-13 (2014) (instituting a two-
year redemption period, provided the redeeming party meets certain requirements 
within one year of the public auction). 
 111. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 81, § 7.19, at 846–48 (noting the 
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encourages purchasers at foreclosure sales to bid up to the fair 
market value of the property by affording the mortgagor the 
opportunity to repurchase the property at the price paid by the 
buyer at the foreclosure sale.112  
Anti-deficiency statutes are the most efficacious of the 
debtor-protection measures.113 Although no state forbids 
deficiency judgments in all cases,114 the California law is the most 
comprehensive because its protections extend to commercial 
borrowers.115 It is also the most complex,116 frequently creating 
bewilderment among attorneys in other jurisdictions.117 Enacted 
in 1933, the California statute was intended to prevent future 
real estate recessions from spiraling into depressions.118 Although 
                                                                                                     
efficiency of the power-of-sale foreclosure process); infra note 235 and 
accompanying text (describing the short process that accompanies a foreclosure by 
power-of-sale). 
 112. See Tierney, supra note 67, at 190 (concluding that the statutory right 
of redemption protects the mortgagor from an unfair price on foreclosure sales). 
 113. In the wake of the Depression, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws called for the elimination of deficiency 
judgments entirely. See MODEL POWER OF SALE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACT 
(1940), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 254, 254–64 (1940) (believing such elimination of deficiency 
judgment was “urgent” and that its passage would materially benefit “both 
mortgagors and mortgagees”). 
 114. See Pence, supra note 22, at 180 (emphasizing that no geographic 
variation exists for the variable of deficiency judgments). 
 115. See SANDRA H. JOHNSON, ET AL., PROPERTY LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 707 (3d ed. 2006) (comparing different states’ anti-deficiency statutes 
and emphasizing the broad nature of California’s statute due to its extension of 
protection to commercial borrowers). 
 116. See Hill, supra note 106, at 268 (describing California’s statute as not 
only the most “complex,” but also the “most comprehensive anti-deficiency 
legislation of any state”). 
 117. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 81, § 8.3 (describing the great 
variation between California’s anti-deficiency laws and those of other states).  
 118. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 989 (Cal. 1975) (explaining 
how the California statute “prevents the aggravation of the downturn” that 
would result without it). The statute prohibits a deficiency judgment following 
any foreclosure by power-of-sale. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 2015) 
(prohibiting deficiency judgments for real property sold under a power-of-sale 
clause contained in the mortgage). This provision is in the nature of a trade off 
in return for the borrower not having a statutory right of redemption following 
power-of-sale foreclosure. The statute also prohibits deficiency judgments 
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the scope of protection is less extensive and more ambiguous than 
California, several other states similarly prohibit lenders from 
pursuing borrowers for deficiency judgments under certain 
circumstances when foreclosure yields proceeds of sale that are 
insufficient to cover the amount of the debt.119  
Fair value legislation, while not prohibiting lenders from 
seeking deficiency judgments, is a significant substantive 
limitation on their size.120 Fair value statutes exist in twenty-
nine states in various forms,121 although it is not always possible 
                                                                                                     
following foreclosure of any mortgage given to the vendor of property to secure 
the unpaid balance of the purchase price. See id. § 580(b) (preventing deficiency 
judgments that come after a foreclosure to obtain an unpaid balance from the 
borrower). The rationale for this provision is to protect against sellers’ natural 
tendency to overvalue real property for which there is no independent check 
when the vendor is also the lender. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 81, 
§ 8.3, at 959 (identifying the justification for the provisions in the California 
anti-deficiency statute). This rationale has been criticized as highly dubious. See 
id. (supporting others’ criticism of the overvaluation rationale). The statute 
prohibits deficiency judgments following foreclosure of a purchase-money 
mortgage on a dwelling containing not more than four families, regardless of the 
method of foreclosure and the identity of the mortgagee. See CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 580(b) (listing various situations that do not result in the owing of a 
deficiency judgment). 
 119. See GHENT, supra note 70, at 31–33 (listing states with some form of 
anti-deficiency legislation). 
 120. See Tierney, supra note 67, at 183 (describing New York’s fair value 
legislation as a “decided departure from the previous rule”). New York’s fair 
value statute was the first of its kind. See id. (“One of the most notable 
examples has been the statutory change in New York, since it was the first of its 
kind . . . .”). It was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as enforceable against a 
constitutional challenge that it violated the Contract Clause. See Honeyman v. 
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 545 (1939) (holding that a lender’s contractual rights were 
not impaired by calculation of a deficiency based on a lower court finding that 
the fair value of mortgaged property was $25,318, notwithstanding that the 
lender had acquired the property at a foreclosure sale for $7,500). 
 121. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (Westlaw through 2015); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-112 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d. Ex. Sess.); CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-38-106(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d. Reg. Sess.); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 49-14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-
14-161 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-108 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 2d. Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2415(b) 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2723, 2771 
(Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6324 (Westlaw 
through 2013 2d. Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3280 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.30 (West, Westlaw 
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to identify and classify a statute with complete confidence.122 
These statutes create what is considered to be a fairer method 
than the traditional common law mechanism for assessing the 
debtor’s personal liability upon default.123 They typically limit the 
deficiency to the difference between the remaining mortgage debt 
and the fair market value of the collateral at the time of 
foreclosure or the price paid by the foreclosure sale purchaser, 
whichever is greater.124 Depending on the statute, a trial court or 
a jury is responsible for determining fair value.125 These statutes 
reflect the position embodied in section 8.4 of the Restatement.126  
                                                                                                     
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); NEB. STAT. REV. ANN. § 76-1013 (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 2014 2d. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.459 (West, Westlaw through 
2014 Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. 
Sess.); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 
Legis. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-21.36 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-19-03 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. 
Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.17, 2329.20 (West, Westlaw though 2013–
2014 Legis. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (Westlaw through 2014 Sec. 
Sess.); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-700 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 21-47-16 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-5-
118 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.); VT. R. CIV. P. 80.1; WASH REV. CODE. ANN. 
§ 61.12.060 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–3 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 846.165 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380). 
 122. Florida’s deficiency statute has been characterized as “unique and 
ambiguous.” NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 81, § 8.3, at 945. The statute 
appears to give trial courts the flexibility to choose between the foreclosure sale 
price and the market value of the foreclosed real estate in a deficiency judgment 
proceeding. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031(8) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d. 
Reg. Sess.) (“[T]he amount bid at the sale may be considered by the court as one 
of the factors in determining a deficiency under the usual equitable principles.”).   
 123. See Tierney, supra note 67, at 183 (“The essence of this change, as it 
affected the calculation of the deficiency, was that the ‘fair value’ of the 
property, rather than the foreclosure sale price, was to be set off against the 
balance due on the mortgage.”). 
 124. See id. (describing the change in the deficiency judgment calculation 
after fair value legislation passed).  
 125. Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney 2011) 
(limiting deficiency to fair market value, as determined by the court), with 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.30 (West 2012) (providing that all issues of facts, 
including the fair market value of the property, “shall be tried by a jury”). 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES. § 8.4 cmt. a (1997) 
(“The approach in this section is embodied in statutes in many jurisdictions, but 
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No state court has followed the Restatement 
recommendation to adopt the fair value approach through the 
exercise of its equity jurisdiction.127 The few state court decisions 
applying the fair value approach based on common law in the 
absence of a statute are states that have traditionally done so.128 
Other courts have declined invitations to adopt the fair value 
approach,129 the Missouri Supreme Court being the most 
recent.130 The effect of its decision on Mike Matheny’s case will be 
examined in Part IV of this Article.131  
                                                                                                     
the principles of this section are applicable whether a statute requires it or 
not.”). 
 127. See First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 224 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (pointing out that states do not adopt the fair value approach to 
deficiency judgments under their equity jurisdictions). 
 128. See, e.g., Wansley v. First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So. 2d 1218, 
1225 (Miss. 1990) (emphasizing that every aspect of a sale must be commercially 
reasonable and fair); First NH Mortg. Corp. v. Greene, 653 A.2d 1076, 1079 
(N.H. 1995) (reprimanding the mortgage company for failing to obtain a fair 
price); Licursi v. Sweeney, 594 A.2d 396, 401 (Vt. 1991) (preventing a plaintiff 
creditor from becoming unjustly enriched while relying on the common law).  
 129. See Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Doering, 516 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1987) (“Our legislature has included no such minimum price provision 
in the statute governing foreclosure sales, and we find no basis for reading such 
a provision into the statute.”); R.I. Depositors’ Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Macomber, 
658 A.2d 511, 511 (R.I. 1995) (“In a series of cases this court has determined 
that the amount realized at a mortgagee’s sale, even when bid at less than the 
appraised value would not be disturbed in the absence of fraud or impropriety in 
connection with the sale.”). After first adopting the judicial fair market value 
standard, a subsequent decision by the Montana Supreme Court appears to 
require some individualized showing of unfairness before allowing testimony 
that the property value exceeds the foreclosure price. See FSLIC v. Hamilton, 
786 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Mont. 1990) (pointing out the lack of facts demonstrating 
the price was not fair), overruling Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont.-Carpenters-
Emp’rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P’ship, 780 P.2d 608, 619 (Mont. 1989) 
(requiring a fairness analysis of the price prior to approving a sale). 
 130. See infra notes 201–202 and accompanying text (retelling the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s decision to forgo adoption of the Restatement position).   
 131. See infra Part IV (discussing Mike Matheny’s personal situation and its 
relation to Missouri law). 
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IV. Chesterfield of Dreams 
Commercial real estate developers are obsessive visionaries 
and perpetual optimists. While others who gaze upon vacant 
Blackacre see nothing more than a farm field (except, of course, 
for property professors, who see a bundle of sticks), a real estate 
developer pictures a new housing community. A developer sees an 
underutilized city block and imagines a mixed-use office or retail 
complex.132  
The very qualities essential to success in commercial real 
estate—ambition and audacity—are a lethal admixture during a 
severe economic downturn.133 Even a developer with the best 
track record for performance is at the mercy of changes in market 
conditions that occur in the interval between land acquisition and 
completion of construction.134 Besides marketplace risk, real 
estate development involves a myriad of temporal and 
transactional risks, any one of which will likely result in 
failure.135 Because of the infinite variety of unanticipated events 
that can and will occur, real estate development is the 
prototypical example of the Anna Karenina principle.136 
                                                                                                     
 132. See ROBIN P. MALLOY & JAMES C. SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed. 2013) (noting how a real estate 
developer views potential properties and their future purposes).  
 133. See generally STEVEN MILLHAUSER, MARTIN DRESSLER: THE TALE OF AN 
AMERICAN DREAMER (1996) (describing the melancholy and risky lifestyle of a 
real estate developer). Millhauser received the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 1997 
for his exploration of the psyche of a real estate investor in this novel. 1997 
Winners and Finalists, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/ 
awards/1997 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 134. See CHARLES J. DELANEY, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND THE LAW IN 
THE 1980S 2 (R. Levitt & A. Ntephe eds., 1983) (noting the high risk, high 
reward nature of a real estate developer’s career). Increased citizen 
participation in the governmental approval process and the growing popularity 
of the temporary moratorium on issuance of development permits make it 
virtually impossible for even the most experienced real estate developers to 
predict the time and economic climate their finished product will face when it 
comes on the market. See id. (citing various factors as significant developments 
affecting the permitting process in the 1980s). 
 135. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the myriad of 
risks associated with real estate ventures). 
 136. The Anna Karenina principle describes an endeavor where a deficiency 
in any one of a number of factors will cause the endeavor to fail. See, e.g., David 
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In July 2006, Daryl Doran left MPD to start a gym.137 In 
January 2007, the remaining members, Matheny and Brett 
Phillips, obtained a line-of-credit loan from The Business Bank of 
St. Louis to market, and perhaps ultimately develop, eleven acres 
of vacant land situated in Chesterfield,138 a densely populated 
and affluent second-ring suburb approximately twenty-five miles 
west of St. Louis.139 The loan was evidenced by a promissory note 
in the principal sum of $6.3 million and secured by a deed of 
trust.140 In June 2007, MPD signed a second promissory note in 
the principal sum of $5 million, also secured by a deed of trust, to 
                                                                                                     
Roher, Strikeouts and the Anna Karenina Principle, or: Why Ks Don’t Hurt MLB 
Batters, THE HARVARD SPORTS ANALYSIS COLLECTIVE (Nov. 25, 2009), 
https://harvardsportsanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/strikeouts-and-the-
anna-karenina-principle-or-why-ks-dont-hurt-mlb-batters/ (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015) (describing the Anna Karenina principle and its alternative correlation) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Thus, a successful endeavor 
is one that avoids every possible deficiency. The name of the principle derives 
from the opening sentence of Leo Tolstoy’s 1878 masterpiece: “Happy families 
are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” See id. (quoting 
Leo Tolstoy’s novel at the beginning of the article). Scholars and authors have 
extended this idea beyond families to other endeavors where success requires 
avoiding many separate possible causes of failure. See id. (extending the 
principle to baseball).  
 137. Hunn & Goold, supra note 55. Following Doran’s departure, MPD 
consisted of two members: Mikris Investments, L.L.C., an entity owned by 
Michael and Kristin Matheny in equal shares; and Monarch Holdings, L.L.C., 
owned by Brett Phillips and his wife. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s 
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Statement of Additional Material Facts at 
3, Bus. Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 
2013) (describing the membership of MPD as of October 16, 2008). 
 138. See GREAT RIVERS GREENWAY, MISSOURI RIVER GREENWAY—MONARCH-
CHESTERFIELD LEVEE TRAIL (describing the Chesterfield Valley and its history). 
Located near the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, Chesterfield 
has become “one of the region’s hottest retail markets”  since being redeveloped 
after the Great Flood of 1993, which caused fifty deaths and $12 billion in 
property damage. Id. 
 139. See TAUBMAN, TAUBMAN PRESTIGE OUTLETS CHESTERFIELD (2014) 
(reporting that more than 1.6 million people live within twenty miles of the 
property, and the average household income within ten miles of the property is 
approximately $100,000).  
 140.  See Order at 2, Bus. Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-
CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) (noting that, on January 4, 2007, MPD delivered a 
promissory note to the bank, agreeing to repay the bank the principal sum of 
over $6.3 million, plus interest). 
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evidence debt incurred to refinance a mortgage encumbering an 
adjacent parcel of improved property, known as the U.S. Turf 
Building, and to provide funds for tenant improvements.141  
An observation of the property discloses why it would have 
been irresistibly attractive to Matheny at the height of the bubble 
in real estate values. Although the eleven-acre parcel remains 
undeveloped and listed for sale at the time of this Article, the 
property enjoys a prime location accessible to, and visible from, a 
major interstate highway. It is proximate to two outlet malls that 
collectively house 120 stores142 and Chesterfield Commons, which 
is reported to be the largest strip mall in the nation.143 A levee 
fitness trail at the rear of the parcel enhances its value for retail 
or corporate use.144 There are no apparent topographical or site 
conditions that would prevent its development in a manner 
comparable to the neighboring property, assuming that the real 
estate market continues to strengthen and that lenders regain 
confidence.145 Its location has been marketed by the city as 
“Chesterfield of Dreams.”146 Gazing upon the vacant field, 
Matheny likely would have envisioned a big-box retail store with 
acres of surrounding parking or perhaps a health-care facility.  
Because MPD was a limited liability entity, Mike and Kristin 
Matheny were required to personally guarantee a portion of the 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 3. The first note matured on January 4, 2009, and the second on 
March 31, 2009. Id. at 3–4. 
 142. See Explore the Taubman Properties, TAUBMAN, www.taubman.com/ 
taubman-properties (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (marketing the Taubman Prestige 
Outlets to residents and out-of-town visitors by virtue of its open-air village 
design, brand-name stores, amenities, and special events) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 143. See Mary Delach Leonard, After the Great Flood of ’93, Chesterfield 
Valley Emerged From Gumbo Flats, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Aug. 7, 2013, 6:46 AM), 
https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/32199/chesterfield_valley_one_080513 (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015) (denoting Chesterfield Commons as the largest strip mall 
in the country) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 144. See id. (depicting the paved trail on top of the levee).  
 145. See id. (remarking on the high quality of the land as one of the reasons 
Chesterfield Valley rebuilt so strongly). 
 146. See id. (explaining that the city marketed the valley in this way and set 
about rebuilding despite the “nationwide calls by engineers and 
environmentalists to limit floodplain development after the ’93 flood”).  
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debt in the total sum of $4.2 million.147 A personal guarantee of 
repayment, a material credit enhancement from the lender’s 
perspective, is the most dreaded concession a real estate 
developer can make.148 A guarantor assumes a compound triple 
risk of potential liability in the event of default by the principal 
obligor, consisting of liability on the guarantee, liability for the 
guarantor’s own attorney’s fees to defend against the creditor’s 
claim, and liability for the creditor’s attorney’s fees in seeking to 
enforce the guarantee.149  
Once a developer accumulates sufficient net worth and a 
solid track record, institutional lenders are more willing to forgo 
personal guarantees. Until then, a novice real estate investor like 
Matheny is likely to be confronted with a demand for a guarantee 
that, if called and honored, could wipe out a lifetime of 
accumulated assets.150 In this sense, a personal guarantee is no 
different from, and no less attractive than, investing one’s own 
cash in the deal.  
In the context of a loan secured by improved property already 
under lease, a personal guarantee may be relatively benign. To a 
certain extent, the location has already been proven. The 
property may have a record of generating sufficient rental income 
to cover operating expenses. Yet personal liability in a loan 
transaction involving investment property is hardly risk free. 
Even the most credit-worthy tenant can become bankrupt or 
                                                                                                     
 147. See Order, supra note 140, at 5, para. 26 (noting that “[t]he Bank relied 
on the Matheny Guaranty in extending credit to MPD pursuant to the MPD 
Notes”). Brett Phillips and his wife, Kelly, also signed a personal guarantee. See 
Plaintiff’s Petition at 97, Bus. Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-
CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) (alleging that the Bank relied on this guarantee in 
extending credit to MPD). Initially, the principals had agreed to guarantee fifty 
percent of the debt. As part of an extension of the maturity date in June 2009, 
the Mathenys’ guarantee was modified to provide that their liability was limited 
to $4.2 million, plus costs of enforcement. See id., at 108 (stating the costs of 
enforcement included attorneys’ fees and legal expenses). 
 148. See TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, 18A MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, REAL ESTATE 
LAW—TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES § 56:1 (3d ed. 2006) (noting all of the 
multifarious risks attending personal guarantees of repayment). 
 149. See id. (describing the underappreciated and palpable risks associated 
with personal guarantees of repayment). 
 150. See id. (noting the numerous serious risks attending personal 
guarantees that can devastate one’s financial security). 
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engage in strategic default. Insurance proceeds may be 
inadequate to cover a catastrophic loss. The economic viability of 
a location may change. 
The risks involved in development projects are exponentially 
greater. They include, but are not limited to, adverse 
environmental, geological, or other site conditions; inability to 
obtain, or delay in obtaining, governmental permits; changes in 
zoning, land use regulations, and building codes; delays due to 
severe weather or other acts of God; and the bankruptcy of the 
general contractor or a key subcontractor.151  
Matheny’s downfall was the result of the inability to lease 
space as quickly as projected when the commercial real estate 
market plummeted. MPD spent three years in an unsuccessful 
attempt to market the property, with Brett Phillips leading the 
effort.152 St. John’s Mercy Hospital and a flooring company, 
among others, expressed interest in leasing space. After they 
backed out as potential tenants, MPD’s plans for the property 
seemed to unravel. From Matheny’s deposition testimony,153 and 
consistent with his track record,154 MPD’s intentions for the 
property were ambiguous and likely included either development 
or sale to a third party for a profit.155 Matheny would later 
                                                                                                     
 151. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 132, at 13–17 (illuminating the 
numerous risks and obstacles attending development projects); see also Boris 
Agranovich, How Real Estate Developers Manage Their Risks?, GLOBAL RISK 
CONSULT, http://www.globalriskconsult.com/article-6-real-estate.php (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015) (enumerating and categorizing the different types of risks 
associated with development projects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 152. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 25 n.9, Bus. Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs., L.L.C., No. 10SL-
CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) (“Defendants unsuccessfully attempted to market the 
projects at issue for over three years.”). 
 153. See Defendants’ Response, supra note 137, at 12 para. 29 (quoting 
Matheny’s deposition from Sept. 12, 2011). 
 154. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (suggesting that Matheny 
was investing with an expectation of certainty in profits, regardless of whether 
the real estate was acquired for development or “flipping”). 
 155. See Defendants’ Response, supra note 137, at 6 para. 14 (indicating 
that MPD’s intentions regarding whether it was going to develop or sell the 
property to a third party for profit were unclear). 
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acknowledge that there might not have been much of a plan to 
begin with.156  
During this period the parties agreed to a series of loan 
modifications where the maturity dates of the two promissory 
notes were extended.157 After Phillips filed for bankruptcy,158 and 
as part of a loan modification in June 2009, the Mathenys 
complied with a demand by the lender to furnish additional 
collateral, consisting of a $1 million mortgage lien against their 
principal residence and a pledge of a $1 million investment 
account maintained at the bank.159  
Matheny made the last $16,000 monthly debt service 
payment on March 30, 2010.160 At a meeting with bank officers on 
May 3, 2010, Matheny informed the lender that he would make 
no further payments on the loan.161 On June 24, 2010, the lender 
filed suit against MPD in St. Louis County Circuit Court seeking 
to collect the unpaid balance, including interest, late charges, and 
expenses.162 The Mathenys were named as defendants in their 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Wagman & Mann, supra note 10 (“‘At the time of purchase, I don’t 
think there was much of a plan,’ Matheny said.”). 
 157. See Order, supra note 140, at 5 (“The parties entered in 
negotiations . . . that culminated in a further Modification Agreement dated 
June 30, 2009 whereby the Bank agreed to further extend the maturity date of 
the MPD Notes to May 31, 2010, and limited the Matheny Guarantors’ 
liability.”). 
 158.  The lender’s complaint against Phillips was returned unopened. Bus. 
Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Docket Sheet] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A 
default judgment in the sum of approximately $5 million was entered against 
him on September 16, 2013. Id. 
 159. See Rick Desloge, Former Cardinal Mike Matheny Out At Home, ST. 
LOUIS BUS. J. (July 11, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories 
/2010/07/12/story4.html?page=all (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (detailing the 
Mathenys’ obligations under the modified loan arrangement) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 160. See Order, supra note 140, at 6 para. 28 (“The last monthly payment 
the Bank received from MPD for the MPD Notes was on March 30, 2010.”). 
 161. See id. at 7 para. 41 (“At that meeting, Mike Matheny informed the 
Bank that MPD would not be making any more interest and principal payments 
under the MPD Notes.”). By letter dated May 11, 2010, Matheny affirmed that 
he would make no further payments. Defendants’ Response supra note 137, at 
28 para. 63. 
 162. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 147. 
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capacity as guarantors.163 The Business Bank foreclosed on both 
properties by power-of-sale, and they were sold at auction at the 
St. Louis County Courthouse on July 12, 2010.164 The lender 
purchased the eleven-acre parcel for $2.5 million and the U.S. 
Turf Building for $2 million, for a total of $4.5 million, which it 
credited against the debt.165 There were no other bidders.166 
David Gamache, a loan officer for The Business Bank, 
testified during pretrial discovery that the lender resold the U.S. 
Turf Building to Frisella Properties for $2,650,000 in November 
2010, four months after acquiring title at the foreclosure sale for 
$2 million.167 Matheny received no credit for the $650,000 gross 
                                                                                                     
 163. See id. at 7, 9 (naming Mikris Investments, L.L.C. and Monarch 
Holdings, L.L.C. also as guarantor defendants). 
 164. See Order, supra note 140, at 7 para. 43 (“On July 12, 2010, the Bank 
conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the 11 Acre Parcel and the US Turf 
Building pursuant to Deeds of Trust the Bank held relating to those 
properties.”). Notice of the foreclosure sale was published in twenty-one 
consecutive issues of the St. Louis Countian in compliance with the Missouri 
power-of-sale foreclosure statute. See Defendants’ Response, supra note 137, at 
44 para. 107 (“The Bank conducted a non-judicial public foreclosure sale for the 
11 Acre Parcel and US Turf Building in accordance with Missouri law on July 
12, 2010.”). 
 165. See Jake Wagman, Missouri Supreme Court Decision Could Hit 
Matheny in the Wallet, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/missouri-
supreme-court-decision-could-hit-matheny-in-the-wallet/article_c34069aa-88d1-
11e1-92b5-0019bb30f31a.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“The bank ‘purchased’ 
the land for $4.5 million, which is to say it took the property and credited the 
sale amount to Matheny's debt.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 166. See id. (noting that a bank is often the only bidder at foreclosure 
auctions). As is typically the case in foreclosure sales, The Business Bank 
acquired title to the property in the name of an affiliated entity, Maryland Land 
Co., L.L.C. See Rick Desloge, Business Bank of St. Louis Gets Foreclosed 
Matheny Property, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2010/07/12/daily17.html?page=all 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“[The Business Bank] bid for the property through a 
company related to Business Bank, Maryland Land Co. L.L.C.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). MPD Investments, L.L.C. was formally 
dissolved on September 9, 2013, the eighth anniversary of its organization. MO. 
SEC’Y OF STATE, ADMINISTRATIVE DISSOLUTION OR CANCELLATION FOR A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY (Sept. 9, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 167. See Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief at 7, First Bank v. Fischer & 
Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (No. SC91951) (referencing 
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profit. Gamache estimated that the lender spent between $70,000 
and $100,000 on tenant improvements before the sale to 
Frisella.168 Responding to defense counsel’s questioning, Gamache 
conceded that the contract of sale was signed a month after the 
foreclosure and provided for a relatively short executory period 
but denied that The Business Bank had any discussions with 
Frisella prior to the foreclosure.169 Regarding the eleven-acre 
parcel, Gamache acknowledged that The Business Bank did not 
pay fair market value, which he estimated as “closer to $3 
million.”170 He said the lender discounted the purchase price by 
the broker’s commission it would have to pay upon resale and 
expenses it expected to incur during its ownership of the 
property.171  
The Matheny residence was sold in advance of a scheduled 
foreclosure for $1.9 million, of which $1 million was credited 
against the debt.172 Matheny’s investment account was seized, 
and its $1.1 million value was credited against MPD’s 
indebtedness.173 Calculated in the traditional arithmetical 
manner, and after receiving credit for these two items of 
collateral, the deficiency exceeded the $4.2 million for which the 
Mathenys had agreed to be personally liable.174  
                                                                                                     
the fact that The Business Bank had paid $2 million for property that it sold 
four months later for $2,650,000). 
 168. See Gamache Dep., 129:16–19, Oct. 17, 2011, Bus. Bank of St. Louis v. 
MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) (providing additional 
explanation that “there was some build-out done for the tenant, but there was 
also some work that needed to be done to the building itself that was not the 
tenant’s responsibility”). 
 169. Id. at 132–37. 
 170. Id. at 11. 
 171. Id. at 113–15. 
 172. Reply Memorandum, supra note 152, at 26. 
 173. Id. at 26–27. 
 174. See id. at 28 (noting that the agreements between the parties did not 
contemplate that the Mathenys’ guaranties will be reduced by amounts received 
from the sale of the Matheny residence or from the sale of the Matheny Trust’s 
investment account). After all applicable credits, the lender claimed it was still 
owed a total of $4.9 million on the two notes, including unpaid principal, 
accrued interest, late charges, and expenses. Id. Matheny claimed that his 
guaranty obligation should have been credited with the proceeds from the sale of 
his residence and the value of his investment account, a claim that was contrary 
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The defense of a solvent guarantor involves a predictable 
strategy. Through exhaustive pretrial discovery and motion 
practice, guarantor’s counsel demonstrates its ability and 
willingness to outwork the silk-stocking law firm that typically 
represents an institutional lender. Besides the voluminous loan 
instruments following a series of modifications and extensions, 
documents produced through discovery include thick binders 
filled with underwriting and administration guidelines, which no 
lender ever follows without some deviation. If introduced into 
evidence at trial, the potential for generating confusion and 
sympathy will motivate the lender to settle, rather than risk 
trying the case to a jury of the guarantor’s peers or, in Matheny’s 
case, a jury of his fans.175  
The success of this defense strategy requires surviving the 
lender’s motion for summary judgment.176 Conventional wisdom 
once held that courts were reluctant to grant even partial 
summary judgment.177 It is a relatively recent phenomenon for 
lenders to expect guarantees to be fully enforceable as a matter of 
law.178 A state-of-the-art guarantee is unambiguous and tightly 
drafted, with waivers of every conceivable defense.179 Reflecting a 
nationwide trend, Missouri trial judges have become less 
                                                                                                     
to the express language of the Mathenys’ guarantees. See Order, supra note 140, 
at 16 (“[T]he January 4, 2007 guaranty and the guaranty executed in June, 2009 
specifically provide that the Matheny Guaranty ‘will only be reduced by sums 
actually paid by Guarantor under this Guaranty, but will not be reduced by 
sums from any other sources . . . .’”). 
 175. A third-party guarantor has defenses that are unavailable to a 
principal like Matheny, such as lack of notice of extensions granted to the 
obligor by the lender and modifications made without the guarantor’s consent.  
 176. See TRYNIECKI, supra note 148, § 56:6 (explaining that, despite the 
availability of multiple defenses, “lenders are often able to obtain summary 
judgment to enforce liability under guarantees”). 
 177. See id. (“The common experience was that trial judges did not grant 
summary judgment, and if they did, appellate courts would not uphold them.”). 
 178. See id. (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), helped revitalize the use of the summary 
judgment motion as an effective approach to litigation).  
 179. See id. (noting that the viability of the summary judgment motion 
encourages holders of guaranties “to draft and administer their guaranty to 
maximize the potential for summary judgment”).  
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reluctant to grant summary judgment in cases seeking to enforce 
personal guarantees.180   
On November 1, 2011, The Business Bank filed its motion for 
summary judgment against the Mathenys.181 On November 4, 
2011, Circuit Court Judge Tom W. DePriest Jr. stayed the 
Matheny litigation pending the outcome of the appellate process 
in the case of First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel.182 Homebuilder 
Fischer & Frichtel had borrowed $2,576,000 from First Bank to 
finance construction of a twenty-one-lot residential subdivision in 
Franklin County, Missouri.183 Between 2000 and 2005, Fischer & 
Frichtel sold twelve of the twenty-one lots.184 It was unable to sell 
the remaining nine lots after the housing market began to 
deteriorate.185 Fischer & Frichtel ultimately defaulted, and the 
lender commenced foreclosure proceedings.186 At a public sale 
held in December 2008, the lender was the only bidder and 
acquired the nine unsold lots for $466,000.187  
First Bank filed suit seeking to recover a deficiency in the 
sum of $677,875, calculated in the traditional common law 
manner.188 At trial, Fischer & Frichtel presented expert 
testimony from an appraiser that the market value of the lots at 
the time of foreclosure was $918,000, double the amount of the 
lender’s winning bid.189 Internal First Bank documents 
                                                                                                     
 180. See id. (“Recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions have helped give 
vitality to such motions in state court.”). 
 181. Docket Sheet, supra note 158. 
 182. 364 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); see Docket Sheet, supra note 158. 
 183. First Bank, 364 S.W.3d at 218. 
 184. See id. (describing the factual background of the residential 
development project). 
 185. See id. (“Beginning in 2005, the housing market began to decline, and 
Fischer & Frichtel was unable to sell any of the nine remaining lots in this 
particular development.”). 
 186. See id. (noting that Fischer & Frichtel chose to default on the loan 
instead of paying the remaining principal when the loan matured on September 
1, 2008). 
 187. See id. (“First Bank acquired the nine unsold lots after making the sole 
bid of $466,000.”). 
 188. See id. (noting that First Bank sought to recover the difference between 
the principal due on the loan and the amount it had paid for the nine unsold lots 
at the foreclosure sale). 
 189. See id. (noting testimony presented by Fischer & Frichtel that sought to 
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introduced as evidence valued the property at $1,134,000 at the 
time of default in September 2008.190 A First Bank employee 
testified that the bank determined the amount to bid by 
estimating that, in the declining real estate market, the value of 
the property was only $675,000, which should be discounted to 
$466,000 because the lender would need to sell the property in 
bulk rather than as individual lots.191  
The court instructed the jury to award the lender the 
difference between the balance due on the loan less the fair 
market value at the time of foreclosure.192 The jury found that the 
fair market value of the lots was $918,000, the value assigned by 
the borrower’s expert, and that Fischer & Frichtel therefore owed 
First Bank $215,875.193 First Bank filed a motion for a new trial 
based on improper jury instructions, which the trial court 
granted.194 Fischer & Frichtel appealed to the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, which transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme 
Court given the importance of the issue at stake.195  
The Missouri Supreme Court accepted transfer to re-examine 
Missouri’s common law approach in light of the Restatement 
position,196 as adopted by statute in a number of other 
                                                                                                     
imply that the price paid for the nine unsold lots by First Bank grossly 
undervalued their market value, and thereby greatly increased the deficiency 
sum due to it). 
 190. See id. (describing evidence introduced by Fischer & Frichtel to 
demonstrate that First Bank knew its bid significantly undervalued the nine 
unsold lots).   
 191. See id. (relaying trial testimony by a First Bank employee that 
described the factors driving First Bank’s bid amount at the foreclosure sale). 
 192. See id. (“[I]f you find in favor of [First Bank], then you must award 
[First Bank] the balance due [First Bank] on the [loan] on the date of maturity, 
less the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, plus 
interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 193. See id. at 218–19 (noting that the jury found that Fischer & Frichtel 
owed First Bank $215,875 plus $37,500 in interest). 
 194. See id. at 219 (“[First Bank] argu[ed] that the damage instruction was 
contrary to Missouri law because it directed the jury to base the amount of the 
deficiency on the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure 
sale instead of on the amount obtained at the foreclosure sale.”). 
 195. See id. (explaining that the Missouri Court of Appeals transferred the 
case to the Missouri Supreme Court to “address the issue of how to determine 
the amount of the deficiency after a foreclosure sale”). 
 196. See id. at 217 (implying that the Missouri Supreme Court took the case 
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states.197 The court heard oral argument on January 11, 2012.198 
It was apparent from their questions that the judges’ principal 
concern was whether, as a matter involving the balancing of 
competing public policies, this was a decision better left for the 
legislature rather than common law development.199 Creditors 
who can rely on the availability of an efficient method of 
enforcing their mortgage documents reduce their overhead by 
minimizing losses attributable to inefficiency in attempting to 
collect nonperforming loans. Assuming this saving is passed 
through to borrowers, the net result should be lower costs and 
increased availability of mortgage credit to a broad category of 
borrowers at the time of loan origination. It is unsurprising that 
the Missouri Supreme Court would want elected officials to 
determine whether the public benefit of a state’s foreclosure laws 
outweighs the harm to individual defaulting borrowers.200  
In a 6–1 decision filed on April 12, 2012,201 the Missouri 
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to change long-standing 
Missouri law by adopting the Restatement position.202 The court 
                                                                                                     
to examine whether Missouri’s common law approach led to unfairness, 
warranting a modification of this approach).  
 197. See id. (“Each jurisdiction cited by Fischer & Frichtel that has changed 
from basing the deficiency on the foreclosure price to basing it on the property's 
fair market value made that change by statute.”). 
 198. Oral Argument, First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc) (No. SC91951), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov 
/SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/cf8964e9c2a28c4d8625794b0
05022a6?OpenDocument. 
 199. See id. (evincing a reluctance to decide an issue that the judges viewed 
as better fit for legislative resolution). 
 200. See TRYNIECKI, supra note 148, § 58:1 (“Missouri’s power of sale 
foreclosure statute is an extraordinary piece of legal machinery. It is 
theoretically possible to foreclose a major property in little more than a month. 
Compared with most legal remedies, this is a millisecond.”). 
 201. Judges William Ray Price, Jr. and George W. Draper did not 
participate in the decision. First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 
216, 224 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 202. See Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272, 279 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2012) (ruling “[i]n accordance with the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
affirmation of well-established law in Missouri” that the “[d]efendants’ loans 
were credited properly with the amounts paid by Frontenac at the foreclosure 
sales”). “Missouri is not one of those states that goes to great pains to protect 
makers and guarantors of secured obligations from deficiency judgments.” 
TRYNIECKI, supra note 148, § 61:7. 
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ordered a new trial based on the improper instruction to the jury 
to credit Fischer & Frichtel with the fair market value of the nine 
empty lots acquired by the bank at the foreclosure auction, rather 
than the $466,000 purchase price paid by First Bank.203   
Chief Justice Richard B. Teitelman disagreed.204 In a spirited 
dissent,205 he characterized the arithmetical method of 
calculating deficiency judgments as an anomaly in the law of 
awarding damages and inconsistent with the purpose of making 
an injured party whole while avoiding a windfall.206 He described 
the inability to recover the debt through foreclosure in the event 
of default as an inherent risk of lending—a risk for which the 
lender is compensated through the interest rate.207 “That risk of 
loss should not be borne solely by the borrower and then 
                                                                                                     
 203. See First Bank, 364 S.W.3d at 220, 224 (affirming the trial court’s 
award of a new trial on the ground that Missouri and other states following the 
common law method for measuring deficiencies “require a debtor to pay as 
deficiency the full difference between the debt and the foreclosure sale price”). 
 204. See id. at 225 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) (arguing that Missouri law 
measures damages by reference to fair market value in every context except the 
foreclosure context, and that this “anomaly” often results in the defaulting party 
subsidizing “a substantial windfall to the lender”). The Chief Justice of the 
Missouri Supreme Court is the only state court judge who is referred to as 
“Justice,” while other members of the court are referred to as “Judge.” MO. 
CONST. art. V, § 8 (amended 1976). 
 205. See First Bank, 364 S.W.3d at 225 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) 
(conveying the passion of a lone appellate judge sufficiently exercised to take 
pen in hand and, on his own time, write in opposition to the majority). It 
exemplifies Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s classic description of the genre: “The 
dissenter speaks to the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that will carry 
through the years.” BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in LAW AND 
LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 36 (1931). 
 206. See First Bank, 364 S.W.3d at 226 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) 
It is plainly evident that the practical effect of calculating a 
foreclosure deficiency by reference to the foreclosure sale means that 
the secured lender benefits from an often substantial windfall by 
purchasing the property at a discounted price from fair market value 
while also obtaining an inflated deficiency judgment. This windfall is 
subsidized by the already financially distressed debtor. 
 207. See id. at 227 n.5 (“A lender compensates for risk by charging an 
interest rate that is set both by the financial markets and by the lender's 
assessment of the borrower's creditworthiness.”). 
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amplified by measuring the deficiency by reference to the 
foreclosure sale price.”208  
The court signaled its willingness, under different factual 
circumstances, to consider adopting the Restatement approach.209 
The first sentence of Judge Laura Denvir Stith’s majority opinion 
described Fischer & Frichtel as “a sophisticated commercial 
debtor.”210 She reiterated this characterization in the penultimate 
paragraph of her opinion.211 The decision noted that, with more 
than six decades of experience in real estate development, Fischer 
& Frichtel earned revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
and profits in the tens of millions of dollars, from 2005 to 2008.212  
Although the Matheny litigation resumed following the 
decision in First Bank, it now had an anticlimactic quality. The 
court heard oral argument on The Business Bank’s motion for 
summary judgment on October 30, 2012.213 By order dated 
January 11, 2013, Judge DePriest granted summary judgment in 
favor of the lender.214  
The court considered and rejected the defenses left to 
Matheny in the wake of First Bank. Defendants argued that The 
Business Bank violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by 
                                                                                                     
 208. Id.  
 209. See id. at 217 (finding no need to modify the current approach as 
“nearly all of the problems that Fischer & Frichtel alleges concern not the 
fairness of the deficiency determination itself but the fairness of the foreclosure 
sale price due to lack of sufficient notice to obtain alternative financing or other 
bidders” (emphasis added)). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at 224 (“Here, the public policy reasons that form the basis of 
Fischer & Frichtel’s argument for modification of the more than century-old 
practice of using the foreclosure sale price have no application to a sophisticated 
debtor such as it.”). 
 212. See id. at 217–18 (implying that little rationale for modifying the 
current approach exists here as Fischer & Frichtel is not an ordinary bidder, 
such as a homeowner, who often cannot secure financing as a potential bidder 
within the often short statutory minimum time period between the notice of 
foreclosure and the sale). 
 213. Docket Sheet, supra note 158. 
 214. See Order, supra note 140, at 17 (granting summary judgment for The 
Business Bank on Counts I through III of its First Amended Petition and on all 
of Defendants’ First Amended Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims). 
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requiring Kristin Matheny to execute a guarantee.215 The court 
held that the statute was inapplicable, both because Kristin 
Matheny was a joint applicant for the loan in her capacity as a 
50% owner of one of the members of MPD and because she had 
expressly waived the defense at the time of the June 2009 loan 
modification.216  
Matheny claimed that the lender was the first to breach the 
loan agreement.217 He argued that The Business Bank committed 
a material breach by refusing to advance $75,000 of loan proceeds 
for needed tenant improvements at the U.S. Turf Building in 
Spring 2010 and by unlawfully freezing an operating account 
maintained by MPD at the bank at a time when MPD was 
engaged in negotiations with an existing tenant to lease 
additional space and in the process of actively negotiating with 
prospective tenants.218 Matheny sought to portray these actions 
as part of a strategy by the lender to usurp the property and 
profit from its sale.219 The court held that these actions did not 
constitute a breach because they occurred only after Matheny had 
                                                                                                     
 215. See id. at 14 (“Kristin Matheny claims that the Bank violated the 
ECOA . . . in seeking her spousal guaranty.”).  
 216. See id. at 14–16 (noting that “there was no ECOA or Regulation B 
violation,” and that Matheny agreed in the Modification Agreement that “she 
had ‘no defense setoff or counterclaim of any kind whatsoever against the 
Bank.’”). 
 217. See id. at 7–8 (noting that Defendants claimed that First Bank was 
“first to materially breach the MPD Notes by refusing to advance available 
credit or additional credit for tenant improvements at the US Turf Building,” 
and “by unlawfully seizing funds MPD” had on account at First Bank). 
 218. See Reply Memorandum, supra note 152, at 19, 23 (“Defendants claim 
the breach was material because the referenced tenant improvements ‘were 
necessary to bring adequate revenue to MPD in order to service the loans, if not 
a breach of an express agreement, it was a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing’”); see also Defendants’ Counterclaim at 3–4, Bus. 
Bank of St. Louis v. MPD Invs. L.L.C., No. 10SL-CC02512 (Mo. Cir. 2013) 
(alleging that the Bank’s breach occurred “[p]rior to any alleged default on the 
loan” and that the Bank tried to use “the Seized Funds to pay for all or a portion 
of the tenant improvements”).  
 219. See Reply Memorandum, supra note 152, at 25 (“Defendants argue the 
Bank executed a grand scheme to prevent Defendants from making needed 
tenant improvements so it could ultimately oust Defendants from these projects, 
make tenant improvements itself, and then sell the projects for a profit.”). 
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already told the lender that he would not make any further 
payments.220  
Matheny argued that the lender should be barred from 
recovery under the doctrine of commercial frustration.221 He 
argued that his nonperformance should be excused by the 
economic crisis in the real estate and financial markets, events 
which were beyond his control.222 The court cited the decision by 
the Missouri Court of Appeals in First Bank for the proposition 
that the doctrine of commercial frustration was inapplicable.223  
Citing the recent holding in First Bank, Judge DePriest 
summarily rejected Matheny’s argument that he was entitled to 
credit for the fair market value of the properties acquired by the 
lender through foreclosure.224 Judge DePriest may be faulted for 
ignoring the multiple signals in Judge Stith’s opinion that 
provided the basis for distinguishing First Bank in a case 
involving a less sophisticated borrower with virtually no expertise 
in commercial real estate.225  
It would be pure speculation to consider whether Judge 
Stith’s majority opinion was written with the pending Matheny 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Order, supra note 140, at 13 (noting that MPD had already 
defaulted at the time of the alleged request for loan proceeds because it failed to 
make its April 2010 principal and interest payments). 
 221. See id. at 8 (reciting the multiple defenses asserted by the defendants, 
including material breach of the notes, violation of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, and the doctrine of commercial frustration). 
 222. See id. (granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment despite 
the defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims). 
 223. See id. at 11 (“[T]he Court of Appeals has held, in similar cases, that 
the doctrine of “commercial frustration” is inapplicable in cases like this case.”). 
 224. See id. at 14 (declaring that “[d]efendants are entitled to a credit for the 
price bid at foreclosure (which they have received), and nothing more under the 
pertinent loan documents and Missouri law”). 
 225. By way of contrast, just two months after the First Bank decision was 
filed, Senior U.S. District Judge Scott O. Wright of the Western District of 
Missouri concluded that “if the Missouri Supreme Court were to address the 
issue today with the right case, it would follow the Restatement approach for 
valuing the deficiency amount.” M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Sunrise Farms 
Dev., L.L.C., No. 10-0627-CV-W-SOW, 2012 WL 2522671, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 
28, 2012) (emphasis added), rev’d, 737 F.3d 1198 (8th Cir. 2013). In an opinion 
filed on June 28, 2012, Judge Wright cited “clear evidence that the state’s 
highest court would not uphold the prior decision” and determined that he was 
not bound to follow it in a diversity case. Id. 
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litigation in mind. Although not a party in the case, The Business 
Bank had filed a sixty-one-page amicus brief in support of First 
Bank.226 The appellate brief filed by Robert Blitz (an experienced 
commercial litigator who was simultaneously representing the 
Mathenys) on behalf of Fischer & Frichtel contained an explicit 
reference to facts in the Matheny case.227 It is not inconceivable 
that, to borrow a baseball metaphor, Judge Stith attempted to 
give Judge DePriest a sequence of signs that he simply or 
intentionally missed. 
It would also be pure speculation to consider whether the 
outcome would have been different if the Matheny case had 
reached the Missouri Supreme Court ahead of First Bank. 
However, it would not have been the first time that the order in 
which cases arrived for appellate review may have been outcome 
determinative.228  
V. A Modest Proposal 
We saw in Part III that foreclosure historically was never 
intended to effect a liquidation of the mortgaged property, obtain 
repayment of the debt, or determine the extent of the borrower’s 
liability for a deficiency.229 The purpose was simply to transfer 
                                                                                                     
 226. Brief for Bus. Bank of St. Louis as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc) (No. SC91951). 
 227. See Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief at 7, First Bank v. Fischer & 
Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (No. SC91951) (“In fact, 
Fischer & Frichtel is aware of a recent situation in which Business Bank itself 
was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale of its borrower’s commercial 
property . . . .”). The brief referenced the fact that The Business Bank had paid 
$2 million for property that it sold four months later for $2,650,000. See id. 
(noting further that “Business Bank did not credit any portion of the 
$650,000.00 difference to the borrower or guarantors in its deficiency action”). 
 228. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 320 (1986) (implying that 
the U.S. Supreme Court might not have created a narrow standing doctrine for 
plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
if the Court first heard the case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976), before deciding Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975)). 
 229. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining that foreclosure 
only terminated the right of redemption and did not result in a deficiency or 
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title from the borrower so that the lender might gain control of 
the property.230 Only then, in the case of improved property, does 
the lender have an opportunity to inspect the collateral to 
ascertain the degree to which its value has deteriorated from the 
effects of deferred maintenance, neglect, or intentional waste, 
which is not uncommon.231 The lender must also anticipate that it 
may bear the real estate taxes, insurance, and other carrying 
costs of ownership for an extended period of time before 
foreclosed property can be resold, as well as the broker’s 
commission and closing costs.232 A foreclosing lender takes these 
factors into account in determining the maximum amount of its 
bid.233  
From its historical roots and by its very nature, foreclosure 
was not designed to generate the best possible price or even a fair 
price.234 This may be assumed to reflect legislative intent in the 
more-than-half of the states that allow foreclosure by power-of-
sale, where the statutory minimum time period between notice of 
foreclosure and actual sale is often less than a month.235 Given 
                                                                                                     
sale).  
 230. See In re Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 171, 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(indicating that the original purpose of foreclosure was a simple and limited one 
of transferring title). 
 231. See, e.g., TRYNIECKI, supra note 69, § 18:1 (explaining that “[l]oan 
documents often required that the mortgagor maintain the value of 
improvements on the mortgaged property until the mortgage is paid in full”). 
 232. See TRYNIECKI, supra note 148, § 59:2 (setting forth a list of issues a 
lender must consider upon the possibility of default, which ultimately determine 
the timing of foreclosure and the appropriate foreclosure bids). 
 233. See Brief for Mo. Bankers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 17, First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 217, 
221 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (No. SC91951) (“A reasonable lender that contemplates 
purchasing its collateral at a foreclosure sale must anticipate these expenses 
and assume that they will continue over what may be a lengthy period.”). 
 234. See Mattingly, supra note 26, at 95 (recognizing that “[a] good price at a 
foreclosure sale is an accident”). “After buying the property, the lenders take the 
property into their portfolios. They then can take such action as is necessary to 
obtain a fair price, such as publicizing the availability of the property in 
publications likely to engender interest in the property . . . [and] hir[ing] real 
estate agents.” Maury B. Poscover, A Commercially Reasonable Sale Under 
Article 9: Commercial, Reasonable, and Fair to All Involved, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
235, 246 (1994) (drawing an unfavorable comparison between real and personal 
property foreclosures). 
 235. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 81, § 7.19 (explaining that power-
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the grossly inadequate time for potential bidders to secure 
financing or engage in due diligence,236 the depressed price paid 
by the lender as high bidder, and often sole bidder, is an 
incurable structural defect of the system.237 Legislators in non-
judicial-foreclosure states may be presumed to understand that 
property sold at foreclosure, through a process that bears little 
relationship to a negotiated transaction between willing parties, 
is likely to yield considerably less than fair market value.  
Because it ignores these historical and practical realities, the 
traditional common law method of arithmetically calculating 
deficiency judgments is a tool of ignorance. At the other end of 
the extreme, anti-deficiency legislation ignores economic reality. 
Real estate investors enjoy unlimited upside potential through 
their ability to leverage other people’s money.238 Lenders who 
earn a fixed rate of return should not be expected to bear the full 
burden of the risk of declining property values. Protecting 
defaulting borrowers against deficiencies adversely affects a 
broader category of nondefaulting borrowers by increasing the 
cost and reducing the availability of credit.239  
The fair value approach attempts to thread the needle; 
however, in their present form, fair value limitations are subject 
to criticism for their unintended consequences, the soundness of 
                                                                                                     
of-sale foreclosure is permitted in over thirty jurisdictions and that notice 
requirements under power-of-sale foreclosure are usually significantly less 
rigorous than those associated with judicial foreclosure). 
 236. See First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (noting that the statutory minimum time period between notice 
of foreclosure and the actual sale is often less than a month). 
 237. See Brief for Mo. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 233, at 15–16 (noting that 
“[a] foreclosure sale, by definition, involves an unwilling seller, which is 
inconsistent with fair-market value,” and that the foreclosure statutes that the 
legislature has enacted are “not structured to produce sales at fair-market 
value”). 
 238. See id. at 8–9 (explaining that, ordinarily, the borrower has the 
potential to earn returns that dwarf the maximum recovery of the lender and 
that the leverage provided by a lender permits borrowers to obtain a higher 
return on investment than cash purchasers of real estate could obtain in the 
same transaction). 
 239. See infra notes 243–246 and accompanying text (elucidating some of 
the potential unintended consequence of a defaulter-friendly approach to 
foreclosure). 
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their rationale, and especially their failure to provide clarity and 
guidance to triers of fact charged with giving concrete meaning to 
the concept of “fair value.”240  
The fair value approach, as with other defaulter-friendly 
foreclosure laws, has unintended consequences. Adjudicating fair 
value delays final judgment and increases lenders’ foreclosure 
costs.241 The fair market value standard could require costly 
judicial intervention to resolve very small discrepancies between 
the foreclosure price and intrinsic value.242 Lenders predictably 
respond to more burdensome foreclosure laws by charging higher 
interest rates and reducing loan supply.243 For example, mortgage 
loans are statistically significantly smaller in states that require 
judicial foreclosure and limit deficiency judgments than those 
states that do not.244 Smaller loan sizes adversely affect real 
estate values.245 The price that buyers are willing and able to pay 
                                                                                                     
 240. See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection 
Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 489 (1991) (“Among the laws that have been subjected 
to particularly strong criticism are those that protect mortgagors from the 
adverse effects of mortgage default and foreclosure, such as prohibitions on 
deficiency judgments and statutory rights of redemption.”).  
 241. See LEFCOE, supra note 17, at 476 (suggesting that this defeats the 
purpose of a process that was developed for its ease, certainty, and finality). 
 242. See Teacher’s Manual to STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., MODERN REAL 
ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER, at 96 (4th ed. 2008) (noting a potentially 
disconcerting unintended consequence of adjudicating fair value as opposed to 
using the common law method). 
 243. See Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage 
Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146 (1982) (concluding that borrower protection 
laws place upward pressure on interest rates charged by lenders); see also 
Ronald Goldstein, Reforming the Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Process, 97 
COM. L. J. 255, 262 (1992) (explaining that, although anti-deficiency legislation 
may attempt to place the risk of inadequate security on the lender, lenders 
counter by “simply shift[ing] that increased risk to their borrowers in the form 
of higher interest rates”). But see Schill, supra note 240, at 500 (arguing that 
mortgagor protection laws may serve an insurance function and that they “may 
also promote economic efficiency by minimizing the risk of homebuying, leading 
to higher levels of individual well-being and a more optimal level of housing 
consumption”). 
 244. See Pence, supra note 22, at 22 (controlling for geographical variations 
by comparing census tracts that border each other but are located in 
neighboring states with different foreclosure laws). 
 245. See id. at 3 (“Smaller loan sizes may also reflect, in part, an effect of the 
laws on house prices . . . .”). 
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for property is directly related to the cost and availability of 
mortgage financing.246  
The fair value approach is explicitly intended to prevent 
unjust enrichment of the mortgagee through the double recovery 
that would result if it purchases the property at foreclosure at a 
deflated price, obtains a deficiency judgment, and later resells the 
collateral at a profit.247 The problem with this rationale is that 
there are legitimate reasons why a mortgage lender may be 
unwilling to make a higher bid: “The mortgagee might decide to 
let the property go for less if [the lender believes] it is . . . worth 
less than the mortgage balance or if it simply does not want the 
property in its portfolio” for a variety of reasons.248 Another 
problem is that this rationale is only applicable in situations 
where the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure sale because it 
may realize the amount of the debt or more upon resale. It 
protects mortgagors at the expense of nonpurchasing mortgagees 
in situations where a third party purchases.249  
The drafters of the Restatement acknowledged in extenso, 
both in the Comments and Reporters’ Notes to sections 8.3 and 
8.4, the most significant problem with their approach—the 
challenge courts face in adjudicating fair value and the absence of 
clarity or meaningful guidance on the subject.250 
                                                                                                     
 246. See id. (“[B]uyers may not be willing to pay as much for a house if they 
have difficulty obtaining financing.”). 
 247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES. § 8.4 cmt. a (1997) 
(noting that the fair value approach “protects against the mortgagee purchasing 
the property at a deflated price, obtaining a deficiency judgment and, by 
reselling the real estate at a profit, achieving a recovery that exceeds the 
obligation”). 
 248. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 21, § 12:37 (providing 
potential explanations for this phenomenon, including avoidance of adverse 
publicity, environmental liability, and the fact that the lender already has an 
excess of distressed property, known as “Real Estate Owned,” on its books). A 
lender may be seeking a bad debt deduction as an offset against taxable income. 
See id. (explaining some of the reasons why “the decision as to how much to bid 
at the foreclosure sale is a complex one for the mortgagee”). 
 249. See Washburn, supra note 31, at 939 (“Fairness in the mortgage 
foreclosure process can be achieved only by balancing the rights of the 
mortgagee with the need to protect the mortgagor. The fulcrum of this balance 
is the market value of the foreclosed property.”). 
 250. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 8.3, 8.4 (1997) 
(describing the different approaches taken by courts in adjudicating fair value); 
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On this most critical of subjects, the only common feature of 
fair value limitation is that the foreclosure sale price should not 
be determinative of the amount of the deficiency.251 As far as 
measuring the value to be credited against the debt, there are 
almost as many variations as there are statutes.252 It is a fair 
criticism that fair value is left to be determined on an ad hoc 
basis and that the number of relevant factors to be considered is 
mind boggling.253 Is “value” determined solely by reference to 
prevailing prices of comparable property at the time the sale was 
held? Or should the trier of fact consider potential future value 
based on the eventual reversion of prices to the norm? In essence, 
“the rule seems to be that after all the suggested factors have 
been considered, they are to be combined in some mystical 
manner to determine the final ‘value’ through the exercise of 
judgment.”254  
It would be naïve to attribute section 8.4 to magical thinking 
or lack of intent on the part of the drafters.255 The vagueness and 
                                                                                                     
see also Skilton, supra note 11, at 451 
The chief weakness of these statutes would appear to be that they 
speak in terms of ‘fair value,’ but usually set forth no definition of 
‘fair value.’ The determination of ‘fair value’ was a difficult, nebulous 
problem . . . . [T]here were no instructions set forth in the statutes to 
define and clarify the meaning of that rather vague term. And yet 
this was the most important problem. 
 251. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 reporters’ note 
(cataloguing the myriad variations in the way states define “value” for purposes 
of measuring a deficiency judgment, including “fair market value,” “actual 
value,” “true market value,” “fair value,” “reasonable value” and “fair and 
reasonable market value”). The Restatement’s drafters acknowledge that it is 
conjectural whether or not this disarray among states in defining “value” for a 
deficiency judgment is substantive. Id.  
 252. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 101.07(f) (noting 
the different approaches to calculating fair value); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra 
note 81, § 8.3 n.6 (illustrating the great variation among jurisdictions at 
determining how to assess how to credit value against the debt). 
 253. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360, 364 
(N.D. 1988) (“We believe the Legislature intended to let the jury decide, on the 
basis of the facts in each individual case, whether a deficiency judgment is 
appropriate.”).  
 254. Tierney, supra note 67, at 187. 
 255. The Restatement is published by the prestigious American Law 
Institute. Professors Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman, co-authors of the leading 
treatise on land finance law, served as coreporters. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
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subjectivity of section 8.4 confers unlimited discretion upon triers 
of fact to bring their sense of intuitive fairness to bear in granting 
relief to their defaulting neighbors.256 One court has candidly 
acknowledged that the real purpose of the fair value approach is 
to provide a mechanism to force lenders to “share the risk of loss 
if market values fall.”257 Institutional lenders are mindful of the 
unfavorable dynamics of the courtroom setting where triers of 
fact personally confront the victims of economic dislocation.258 
                                                                                                     
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 at v. 
 256. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 101(g)(1) (“Such 
vagueness seems designed to sanction relief on subjective bases to their 
defaulting neighbors and reflects a legislative determination that lenders should 
‘share the risk of loss if market values fall.’” (quoting Fed. Land Bank, 425 
N.W.2d at 363)). Courts interpreting fair value statutes have acknowledged that 
the textbook definition of fair market value (the price a willing buyer will pay to 
a willing seller in an open market) is only one factor among many to be 
considered in determining “fair value.” See Rainer Mortg. v. Silverwood, Ltd., 
209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (“[M]arket value is only one factor 
the court should consider when determining ‘fair value.’”); see also Nat’l Bank of 
Wash. v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 46 (Wash. 1973) (en banc) 
[I]n deciding upon fair value at a foreclosure sale, the court may 
consider the state of the economy and local economic conditions, the 
usefulness of the property under normal conditions, its potential or 
future value, the type of property involved, its unique qualities, if 
any, and any other characteristics and conditions affecting its 
marketability along with any other factors which such a bidder might 
consider in determining a fair bid for the mortgaged property. 
 257. Fed. Land Bank, 425 N.W.2d at 363. See Tierney, supra note 67, at 192 
(“A candid recognition that the statutory requirement has been adopted as an 
expedient to force an equitable sharing of losses in a period of economic and 
financial difficulties would avoid much of the confusion . . . .”).  
 258. Under these circumstances, it is foreseeable that emotional impulses 
may influence judgment, notwithstanding Justice Cardozo’s warning that a 
judge “is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated 
benevolence.” BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 
(1921). “[J]udges, like everyone else, have two cognitive systems for making 
judgments—the intuitive and the deliberative—and the intuitive system 
appears to have a powerful impact on judges’ decision making.” Chris Guthrie et 
al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 
(2007). Hardship cases from the Great Recession invoked powerful forces of 
human nature, such as empathy, indignation, and outrage. For no apparent 
good reason, Miami–Dade County Circuit Court Judge Valerie Schurr in the 
summer of 2009 granted a request by Joseph and Bianca Doyle for continuance 
of Republic Federal Bank’s residential mortgage foreclosure. Republic Fed. Bank 
v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). “I was trying to make 
everybody happy,” Judge Schurr explained in her opinion: 
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Unpredictability of outcome is anathema to the institutional 
lender’s mindset. The fair value concept appears to have been 
designed to motivate the parties to reach a settlement.259  
Nevada is widely considered the epicenter of the collapse in 
real estate values during the Great Recession.260 A recent case 
from the Silver State illustrates the guesswork involved in 
adjudicating property value in fair value states. In Oreo Corp. v. 
Nielson,261 Centennial Hills, L.L.C. entered into a construction 
                                                                                                     
We have so many foreclosures here and I give continuances on these 
sales.  I just do. . . . [Y]ou know, people are having a hard time now. 
They are having a difficult time. Everybody knows it. Businesses are 
failing. People are losing money in the stock market. You know, 
unemployment is high. It’s just everybody knows that we are in a bad 
time right now and I hate to see anybody lose their home. 
Id. at n.1. A Long Island couple was left debt free as a result of a Suffolk County 
judge’s indignation after hearing testimony by the regional manager for 
IndyMac Bank. See IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 
319–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (“Thus, where a party acts in a manner that is 
offensive to good conscience and justice, he will be completely without recourse 
in a court of equity, regardless of what his legal rights may be.”). The lender’s 
intransigent refusal to restructure the couple’s subprime loan, or otherwise 
cooperate in avoiding foreclosure was, according to Judge Jeffry Spinner, not 
only “harsh, repugnant, shocking and repulsive,” but also “inequitable, 
unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious.” Id. at 319. Noting that “Suffolk 
County is in the yawning abyss of a deep mortgage and housing crisis with 
foreclosure filings at a record high rate,” Judge Spinner sua sponte invoked his 
equitable jurisdiction to void the mortgage, erasing the $290,000 principal 
balance and an additional $235,000 in accrued interest and penalties. Id. at 317.  
 259. See Kevin J. Morley, Pension Deficits in Canada—Lenders React to 
Indalex Decision, ABL ADVISOR (June 19, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.abladvisor.com/articles/2574/pension-deficits-in-Canada-lenders-re 
act-to-Indalex-decision (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (analyzing the likely effects of 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s recent Indalex decision on Canadian asset-based 
lending practices) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Floyd 
Norris, After Crisis, A New Spirit of Reining In the Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/business/after-crisis-a-new-spirit-of-
reining-in-the-banks.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (discussing renewed 
debate over banking reform and whether regulatory changes have, in fact, 
changed banks’ behavior) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 260. See Mark Roth, Las Vegas is Ground Zero for America’s Housing 
Collapse, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/businessnews/2011/12/04/Las-Vegas-is-ground-zero-for-
America-s-housing-collapse/stories/201112040240 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) 
(“[H]ome prices in southern Nevada have dropped 65 percent in the past four 
years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 261. No. 2:10-cv-00352-PMP-VCF, 2013 WL 6384535 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2013).  
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loan agreement with KeyBank National Association for $14.1 
million.262 After multiple project delays and resulting extensions, 
the loan finally matured on November 1, 2009.263 After 
Centennial defaulted, a successor to KeyBank purchased the 
property for $5.3 million on March 31, 2010.264 As of that date, 
Centennial owed almost $12.3 million.265 KeyBank’s successor 
sought a deficiency judgment against Centennial for the $7 
million difference between the amount owed by Centennial and 
the purchase price paid at the foreclosure sale.266 Centennial 
claimed that the fair market value of the property at the date of 
the foreclosure sale was $14.9 million and, accordingly, that there 
should be no deficiency judgment.267 
Like other fair value states, Nevada limits deficiency 
judgments to the amount by which the debt exceeds the greater of 
the fair market value of the collateral on the date of foreclosure or 
the high bid at the foreclosure sale.268 An appraiser for KeyBank’s 
successor testified that the fair market value of the property was 
$4.35 million at the time of the foreclosure sale.269 Centennial’s 
appraiser determined the fair market value on that date was 
$14,905,000.270  
What is a trial court to do under such circumstances? In this 
case, the court heard the testimony of a third appraiser who 
testified that the value of real property had fluctuated wildly 
during the real estate recession in Southern Nevada from 2007 
until the time of foreclosure in 2010.271 The third appraiser 
testified to appraisals with the following values: July 2007, $23.3 
million; October 2008, $21.6 million; December 2009, $11.4 
                                                                                                     
 262. Id. at *1. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at *2. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See id. (“The task of the Court in determining whether a judgement 
[sic] creditor or beneficiary under a deed of trust is entitled to recover a 
deficiency judgement [sic] is a relatively straight forward one.”). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. 
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million; and March 2010, $7.8 million.272 In the final analysis, the 
court gave marginal weight to the appraisal evidence introduced 
by the parties for the reason that it was utterly irreconcilable.273 
Compelled to reach a result notwithstanding such evidence, the 
court determined that the third appraiser’s results were more 
reliable and that the fair market value of the property as of the 
date of foreclosure was $7.77 million.274 The court awarded 
KeyBank’s successor a deficiency judgment of $4.6 million.275  
Adjudging property value for deficiency purposes without 
direction or meaningful guidance is an exercise in judicial 
guesswork.276 In remanding a case to the trial court for further 
consideration of a deficiency judgment determined on the basis of 
the arithmetical method, the Montana Supreme Court blithely 
wrote, “[t]he method of determining fair market value we will 
leave to the District Court.”277 Left with little practical guidance, 
and faced with evidence of appraisals that ranged from $562,736 
to $1,595,000, the trial court simply averaged the experts’ values 
at $1.1 million, a result that the state supreme court affirmed.278  
A provocative 1940 law review article contained an audacious 
proposal for reforming the mortgage foreclosure process.279 
Describing the foreclosure sale as “a meaningless farce and an 
entirely unnecessary expense” for which the mortgagor is 
                                                                                                     
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. at *3 (“The Court finds the significantly disparate appraised 
values provided by Lowe and Smith to be irreconcilable and accords marginal 
weight to both.”). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See BENDER, supra note 242, at 441 (presenting examples of judicial 
discretion in determining property value during deficiency proceedings). 
 277. Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp’rs Ret. Trust Fund v. 
Galleria P’ship, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (Mont. 1989). 
 278. Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp’rs Ret. Trust Fund v. 
Galleria P’ship, 819 P.2d 158, 163 (Mont. 1991). Because the appraisals were so 
disparate, the Montana Supreme Court stated that the district court “was 
entitled to discount [all of] the appraisals.” Id. at 165. 
 279. See Vaughan, supra note 87, at 977–80 (proposing a solution that 
retains traditional foreclosure practices that “are essential in producing a more 
equitable balance of the conflicting interests involved” while eliminating those 
that “have become mere form, to be discarded in the interests of an improved 
procedure”). 
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ultimately liable,280 the author called for a return to the practice 
of strict foreclosure as serving the best interests of both parties.281 
The proposal was not well received,282 although it is hard to 
quarrel with the author’s underlying assumptions about the play-
acting nature of open cry auction sales. 
One aspect of the proposal deserves to be revisited. If a 
lender wanted to preserve the ability to pursue the borrower for a 
deficiency, the proposal still called for strict foreclosure, but 
coupled with appraisal of the property to determine its fair 
market value.283 This Article proposes a variation of the appraisal 
mechanism as a means of solving the fundamental problem with 
the Restatement’s approach that was identified by courts and 
commentators seventy-five years ago but remains unaddressed.284  
                                                                                                     
 280. Id. at 979. The principal advantage of the proposal is that it would 
significantly reduce transaction costs, including auctioneer’s fees and 
advertising that is read by no one. 
 281. See id. at 978 (“With certain modifications, it is believed that under [a 
strict foreclosure] procedure, the courts will be better equipped to serve the 
interests of both parties, and at much lower cost.”). The proposal would create 
an exception for the rare situation when the borrower believed the property was 
worth more than the debt and was willing to incur the risk of being wrong. In 
such a case, the debtor may demand a foreclosure sale but would be personally 
liable for the deficiency if the price realized at sale was insufficient to discharge 
the debt plus expenses of sale. See id. (“In this situation, where the foreclosure 
sale is manifestly to the defendant’s benefit, he should be permitted to demand 
one.”). 
 282. Only four states (Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland and Vermont) still 
permit lenders to use the strict foreclosure method and only under limited 
circumstances. See KORNGOLD & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 510 (noting 
examples of cases from states where strict foreclosure is still practiced). 
 283. See Vaughan, supra note 87, at 797 (“On defendant’s default in 
pleading or failure to sustain an alleged defense, plaintiff should be required to 
make a motion on notice . . . for the determination of the fair market value of 
the property.”). 
 284. Given that only about half the states have enacted fair value statutes 
in the decades since New York first adopted its statute in the post-Depression 
era, section 8.4 is less of a restatement of the law, in the plain meaning of the 
phrase, than it is an advocacy for law reform. It is similar in this respect to 
other sections of the Restatement of Property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000) (eliminating the requirement that a covenant 
must touch and concern the land to be enforceable against subsequent owners); 
Id. § 2.4 (eliminating the horizontal privity requirement for covenants running 
with the land). 
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First Bank was a closely watched and well litigated case in 
the immediate aftermath of the worst economic downturn since 
the Great Depression, a time when attention is likely to be 
focused on deficiency judgments.285 The opportunity to adopt 
section 8.4 by judicial decision was squarely presented and 
decisively rejected.286 The task of sifting through irreconcilable 
appraisal testimony to adjudicate the fair market value of real 
property may not be something appellate court judges are willing 
to impose on their trial court counterparts. The direct 
examination of each appraiser in a fair value determination 
proceeding tends to last several hours.287 Cross-examination may 
be expected to take at least as long. When the results are given 
only marginal weight in the final determination,288 and when the 
same result can be reached through a streamlined process,289 it is 
hard to justify the commitment of judicial resources to the 
exercise. 
No state has followed the recommendation of the American 
Law Institute to adopt fair value by judicial decision,290 and it is 
time that it should be withdrawn. In its place the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should 
propose model legislation along the lines of existing statutes in 
                                                                                                     
 285. See J. Louis Warm, A Study of Some of the Problems Concerning 
Foreclosure Sales and Deficiency Judgments, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 167 (1936) 
(“The economic depression has focused the attention of thoughtful persons upon 
the problems relating to foreclosure sales and deficiency judgments . . . .”). First 
Bank appears as a principal case in a newly published casebook in the field. 
MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 132, at 470–77. 
 286. See First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (noting Fischer & Fritchel’s argument that Missouri should 
adopt the liberal standard presented by section 8.4, an argument that the court 
rejected). 
 287. See, e.g., Margaret K. Bentwood, Comment, Deficiency Judgment Relief 
in Montana Foreclosures, 53 MONT. L. REV. 255, 274 (1992) (describing the 
appraiser’s testimony in the Galleria case). 
 288. See supra notes 278 and accompanying text (describing the ultimate 
decision to average the appraisal estimates in Galleria). 
 289. See infra notes 313–323 and accompanying text (presenting an 
approach to deficiency judgment appraisals informed by alternative dispute 
resolution regimes found in long-term ground leases). 
 290. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text (enumerating the few 
states that apply the fair value approach in very limited circumstances). 
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the two states that have achieved a workable solution to the 
problem of calculating deficiency judgments in a fair and efficient 
manner.291 
By statute in South Carolina and Louisiana, a deficiency is 
measured by the difference between the foreclosure sale price and 
the value of the property as established by professional 
appraisal.292 In these states, real estate appraisers act in a quasi-
judicial capacity to make a factual determination of the value of 
the property.293 These statutes strike an appropriate balance 
among the legitimate interests of both the lender and borrower, 
and the public’s interest in judicial economy and the cost of 
borrowing to finance the purchase and improvement of real 
estate.  
The statutes contain significant variations. Louisiana’s 
statute has existed in various forms since 1805.294 It reflects a 
strong public policy of protecting debtors against possible abuse 
from the mortgagee buying the property at a price substantially 
less than its actual market value.295 The legislative intent was to 
avoid the injustice of a mortgagee obtaining a deficiency 
judgment and later reselling the property and realizing a total 
                                                                                                     
 291. UNIF. NONJUDICAL FORECLOSURE ACT (UNFA) (2002), http://www. 
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/nonjudicial%20foreclosure/njf_amo2_final.pdf. 
 292. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 2336–37 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-660 to 29-3-760 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 293. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-720 (outlining the duty of an appraiser 
to make a sworn return stating the value of the property). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has commented favorably on the ability of appraisers to reconcile the 
difference between foreclosure sale value and fair market value. See BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994) (“An appraiser’s reconstruction 
of ‘fair market value’ could show what similar property would be worth if it did 
not have to be sold within the time and manner strictures of state-prescribed 
foreclosure.”). 
 294. See Henry G. McMahon, The Proposed Louisiana Code of Practice: A 
Synthesis of Anglo-American and Continental Civil Procedures, 14 LA. L. REV. 
36, 43 (1953) (discussing the writ-issuing powers the Practice Act of 1805 
granted Louisiana courts). 
 295. See Michael H. Rubin & Jamie D. Seymour, Deficiency Judgments: A 
Louisiana Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 783, 786 (2009) (describing the influence of 
Louisiana’s civil law system on the way it balances the competing interests in 
deficiency judgments). 
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recovery far in excess of the remaining balance owed.296 Both the 
debtor and creditor have a right to appoint an appraiser.297 If 
either party does not timely appoint an appraiser, the sheriff 
makes the appointment on behalf of the party.298 If the two 
appraisers differ by less than $250,000, the appraised value is the 
average of the two.299 If their difference is greater than $250,000, 
the sheriff appoints a third appraiser whose determination 
becomes the value.300  
In South Carolina, the deficiency is measured by the higher 
of the foreclosure sale price and the appraised value.301 The 
borrower has thirty days after the foreclosure sale to ask the 
court for an order of appraisal.302 If the borrower exercises this 
right, the borrower and lender each select an appraiser, and the 
court selects a third.303 Within thirty days of appointment, all or a 
majority of the appraisers must agree on the value of the 
property as of the date of sale.304 The report of the appraisers is 
then recorded as a judgment of the court.305 If a majority is 
unable to agree within the prescribed time period, another set of 
                                                                                                     
 296. See Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Tri-Parish Ventures, Ltd., 881 F.2d 
181, 182 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The rationale of Louisiana’s Deficiency Judgment Act 
is the strong public policy of protecting a debtor from possible abuse resulting 
from the judicial sale of his property without notice and without the benefit of 
proper appraisement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 297. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4363 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 298. Id. § 13:4364. 
 299. Id. § 13:4365(B). 
 300. Id. 
 301. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-680 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 302. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 29-3-680 (1988). 
 303. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-710 (specifying that the appraisers must be 
state-licensed and disinterested parties). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. § 29-3-740. Either party can appeal to the court. Id. In the event of 
an appeal, the only discretion the court has is to order reappraisal. Id. A South 
Carolina bank challenged the constitutionality of the statute claiming that due 
process required it have an opportunity to attend the appraisers’ viewing of the 
property or to present evidence to the appraisers. S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Cent. 
Carolina Livestock Mkt., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 485, 487 (S.C. 1986). The court held 
that the right of appeal afforded the parties sufficient opportunity to be heard. 
See id. at 488–89 (“During the depositions, the Bank was given an opportunity 
to fully examine the appraisers and other witnesses. The parties were also given 
an opportunity to file briefs in support of their respective positions.”). 
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appraisers is appointed until a majority is able to reach 
agreement.306  
Institutional lenders reacted predictably by including 
boilerplate waivers of appraisal rights in mortgage loan 
documents. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that 
contractual waiver of appraisal rights was unenforceable.307 The 
South Carolina legislature responded by amending the statute in 
1996 to allow waiver in commercial transactions if disclosed in a 
capitalized sentence that is underlined, or highlighted in another 
prominent manner, on the signature page of one of the loan 
documents.308  
The involvement of appraisers in a quasi-judicial capacity in 
South Carolina and Louisiana reflects the growing trend toward 
alternative dispute resolution. Since its inception more than 
thirty years ago, alternative dispute resolution has become 
increasingly popular in response to what is perceived as the 
courts’ inability to resolve commercial disputes in a cost-efficient, 
time-effective manner.309 Conflicts that best lend themselves to 
resolution through alternative means tend to be unnecessarily 
costly, time consuming, and complex if pursued through formal 
court proceedings.310 The public benefits from more efficient and 
                                                                                                     
 306. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-730. This aspect of the statute creates the 
potential for unnecessary additional cost and delay. The approach recommended 
in this Article corrects for that defect. 
 307. See SCN Mortg. Corp. v. White, 440 S.E.2d 868, 869 (S.C. 1994), 
overruling Tri-South Mortg. Investors v. Fountain, 221 S.E.2d 861 (S.C. 1976) 
(“We now join those jurisdictions that give effect to a debtor’s statutory rights 
and hold the contractual waiver of appraisal rights invalid as against public 
policy.”). 
 308. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-680. 
 309. See Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator’s Perspective, A.B.A. 
(March/April 1999), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/8-4adr.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“As alternative dispute resolution becomes more accepted, 
and the arbitrators and mediators become more successful in resolving disputes, 
we will probably see even more dispute resolution.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 310. See id. (“[A]rbitration and mediation tend to require significantly less 
cost and time than litigation and thus can alleviate some of the pain of 
litigation.”). 
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effective dispute resolution, which streamlines overcrowded court 
dockets.311  
The approach recommended by this Article is informed by the 
alternative dispute resolution regimen that is intricately woven 
into the long-term ground leases that are frequently used for 
office buildings, shopping centers, hotels, and other commercial 
real estate projects.312 Because of their extended terms (typically 
ranging from fifty to ninety-nine years), ground leases necessarily 
include provisions to adjust the rent periodically to accommodate 
inevitable changes in economic conditions.313 The rent-adjustment 
mechanism is designed to assure the lessor a reasonable rate of 
return decades into the future.314 From the tenant’s perspective, 
                                                                                                     
 311. See STATE BAR OF MICH., ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMPENDIUM (2011), http://www.michigan 
mediates.net/files/Website%20Files/ADR%20Compendium.pdf (demonstrating 
the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of resolving conflicts in the public and 
private sectors through alternative dispute resolution). 
 312. The concept of ground leasing dates back to the Old Testament. See 
Emanuel B. Halper, Planning and Construction Clauses in a Subordinated 
Ground Lease, 17 REAL EST. L J. 48, 48 n.1 (1988) (citing Leviticus 25:10-24). 
Many of the largest metropolitan area commercial properties have long been 
constructed on ground-leased land. See, e.g., TRYNIECKI, supra note 69, § 15.2 
(“For example, many of the old commercial properties in downtown St. Louis 
were built on 99-year leases.”). The New York Times reported in 1909 that 
“nearly all” of the “skyscrapers” in St. Louis were built on leaseholds. St. Louis 
Thriving on Leasehold Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1909. 
 313. See Lawrence Teplin & Heather Stern, Well-Grounded: A Well-Drafted 
Provision for Future Rent Adjustments is Critical in the Negotiation of a Ground 




bv3TnbVufvEOqhXXg (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“In the context of a ground 
lease, the parties must agree to a rent that will be paid over decades and 
adjusted under economic or financial circumstances that will almost invariably 
differ from what at least one, if not both, parties expected when they first 
entered into the lease.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Ground leases frequently include an option for the tenant to purchase the fee, 
exercisable at various intervals during the term, at a purchase price determined 
by an appraisal mechanism that closely resembles the rent-adjustment 
provision. See 936 Second Ave. L.P. v. Second Corporate Dev. Co., 891 N.E.2d 
289, 291–92 (N.Y. 2008) (illustrating operation of appraisal process for 
calculating ground rent). 
 314. See Teplin & Stern, supra note 313 (describing the procedures parties 
can use to ensure that the lease includes a rent adjustment mechanism that can 
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the rent obligation should continue to bear a reasonable 
relationship to the income-producing capacity of the 
improvements over time. 
Although there are alternative means of accomplishing the 
rental adjustment,315 the most common method involves the 
appointment of a panel of appraisers tasked with reaching a final 
determination of fair rental value.316 As codified in California, the 
panel is the functional equivalent of an arbitrator whose decision 
is final.317  
A well-drafted ground lease addresses the number of 
appraisers to be appointed, their qualifications,318 the process of 
appointment, and the time frame within which the process must 
occur, and allocates responsibility for the payment of fees. A 
ground lease typically contains one of three possible appraisal 
processes:319  
1. Each party selects an appraiser, and the two 
appraisers jointly select a third appraiser who is 
charged with determining fair market rental value. 
The clause must address the possibility that the two 
appraisers may be unable to agree on a third 
                                                                                                     
be effectively implemented over the entire term of the lease). 
 315. For example, a ground lease may provide for adjustment of rent based 
on changes in the Consumer Price Index or other benchmark.  
 316. See Teplin & Stern, supra note 313 (“The decisive factor in resolving 
many of the issues associated with defining the rent adjustment mechanism—
including the number of appraisers and their qualifications—is the provision 
that defines who will appoint the appraisers and set the appointment process.”). 
 317. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (West 2014) (providing that this 
alternative dispute resolution process is binding on the parties and enforceable 
in the same manner as a result reached through arbitration). 
 318. MAI (Member of the Appraisal Institute) designation is considered the 
gold standard appraisal accreditation. See EUNICE A. EICHELBERGER, 11 ILL. 
REAL PROPERTY § 59:11 (explaining that “[t]hose with the designation MAI are 
appraisers who specialize in the appraisal of commercial, industrial, residential 
and other types of property”). It is granted to appraisers who are experienced in 
the valuation of commercial and industrial property, as well as residential 
property, with at least 4,500 hours of field experience. See AI Regulations and 
Bylaws, APPRAISAL INST., www.appraisalinstitute.org/designatedcandidate 
affiliate/ai-regulations-and-bylaws/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 319.  See Teplin & Stern, supra note 313 (describing common appraisal 
procedures found in commercial ground leases). 
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appraiser. In such event, the parties may agree to 
petition the court to appoint a third appraiser, or the 
president of the local board of realtors may be tasked 
with making the appointment.  
2. Each party selects an appraiser, and the two jointly 
select a third appraiser. The first two appraisers each 
make a determination of value, and the third appraiser 
chooses between them.320 Because it requires multiple 
determinations of value, this process is more expensive 
and less efficient than the first. Because the third 
appraiser’s discretion is limited to choosing between 
the determinations of the party-appointed appraisers, 
this method may also produce an outcome that lies at 
an extreme end of the range of reasonable value.  
3. Each party selects an appraiser who makes a 
determination of value. If the two are unable to agree, 
they together choose a third appraiser who makes an 
independent determination of value. If a majority of 
the three is unable to agree, the three are averaged 
together. A variation of this approach is to have the 
middle appraisal govern. An alternative variation is to 
disregard any low or high appraisal that varies by 
more than 10% from the middle appraisal before 
averaging the results. 
Because up to three separate appraisals may need to be 
conducted, the third method is likely to be the most expensive 
and time consuming. Nevertheless, in the Author’s experience, it 
is the most widely used method. Parties are rarely willing to rely 
on the determination of a single appraiser, who may be biased 
                                                                                                     
 320. This approach is similar to the way salary arbitrations in Major League 
Baseball are conducted. See Spencer Wingate, Salary Arbitration: What it Is and 
How It Works in Major League Baseball, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), 
www.ibtimes.com/sportsnet/salary-arbitration-what-it-how-it-works-major-lea 
gue-baseball-705189 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“At the hearing each case 
presents why the player should be awarded the salary they have requested for 
the upcoming season. The panel decides to award the higher or lower yearly 
salary. There is no middle ground [sic] either the team or player wins.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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and is surely fallible. If nothing else, a panel of deciders is 
beneficial on the theory that “three heads are better than one.”321  
Borrowers facing personal liability for sizeable deficiency 
judgments are entitled to the same kind of rigorous appraisal 
regimen that sophisticated parties to commercial ground leases 
choose for themselves when important financial consequences are 
at stake.322 The statutory proposal that follows is aimed at 
accomplishing this objective: 
Foreclosure: Action for a Deficiency 
(a) If the foreclosure price is less than the unpaid balance of 
the mortgage obligation, an action may be brought to 
recover a deficiency judgment against any person liable on 
the mortgage obligation in accordance with the provisions 
of this section. 
(b) Subject to subsection (e) of this section, the deficiency 
judgment is for the amount by which the mortgage 
obligation exceeds the foreclosure sale price. 
(c) Any person against whom recovery of a deficiency is 
sought may request in the proceeding in which the action 
for a deficiency is pending a determination of the 
appraised value of the real estate as of the date of the 
foreclosure sale by designating an appraiser within thirty 
(30) days following commencement of such action. Such 
designation shall be made to the clerk of the court, and a 
copy of such designation shall be served upon the creditor 
or its attorney of record. Such appraiser shall make an 
independent determination of value within thirty (30) 
days of such selection, which shall constitute the 
appraised value of the real estate for purposes of 
subsection (e), unless the party seeking a deficiency 
                                                                                                     
 321. Research has repeatedly shown that aggregating a number of 
individual judgments provides a significantly more reliable result. See 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1264 
(2013) (“[T]here is the advantage of probability—the idea that having more 
people answer a particular question can increase the probability of reaching a 
correct answer, even when their conclusions are independent of each other.”). 
 322. See supra note 312 (describing the history of commercial ground 
leases). 
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designates a second appraiser within thirty (30) days after 
receiving the first appraiser’s determination of value. If 
the two appraisers thus selected are unable to agree upon 
the appraised value of the real estate within thirty (30) 
days after selection of the second appraiser, they together 
shall designate a third appraiser who shall make an 
independent determination of value within thirty (30) 
days after selection, in which event the middle of the three 
appraisers’ determinations of value shall constitute the 
appraised value of the real estate for purposes of 
subsection (e). The appraised value thus determined shall 
be filed and recorded by the clerk as a judgment of the 
court. 
(d) If the first two appraisers designated by the parties are 
unable to agree upon the appraised value of the real estate 
and fail to designate a third appraiser within thirty (30) 
days after their selection, then the court having 
jurisdiction of the action or any judge thereof shall appoint 
a third appraiser. 
(e) If it is determined that the appraised value of the real 
estate is greater than the foreclosure sale price, any 
person against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought 
is entitled to an offset against the deficiency in the amount 
by which the appraised value exceeds the sale price. 
(f) For purposes of this section, any appraiser (i) shall have 
the designation MAI; (ii) shall be state-licensed; and 
(iii) shall not be a party to the action, or affiliated in 
business with, or related by blood or marriage to, any 
party to the action. Each appraiser shall be compensated 
by the party who selected such appraiser. The costs of the 
third appraiser, if necessary, shall be paid one-half by the 
party seeking to recover the deficiency and one-half by the 
party or parties against whom such a recovery is sought.323 
                                                                                                     
 323. The following illustration of the operation of the proposed statute is 
based on the facts of Oreo Corp. v. Nielson, No. 2:10-cv-00352-PMP-VCF, 2013 
WL 6384535, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2013). The borrower selects Appraiser A, 
who values the subject property as of the date of foreclosure at $14.9 million. 
The lender selects Appraiser B, who values the property at $4.35 million. 
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VI. Conclusion 
One of millions of borrowers affected by the 2008 economic 
crisis and Great Recession, Mike Matheny’s story may be difficult 
to distinguish from so many others.324 Yet sometimes a story is 
not just a story. A detailed account from a human perspective, 
involving a high-visibility figure recognizable by fans of the Great 
American Pastime, provides a compelling narrative and 
framework for examining a persistent problem in land finance 
law. Deficiency judgments have long been recognized as the 
greatest obstacle to devising a mortgage foreclosure process that 
accommodates the legitimate interests of lenders and borrowers, 
along with the public interest in judicial efficiency and access to 
affordable credit.325 Sadly, but predictably, it takes a severe 
economic downturn like the Great Recession to focus attention to 
the problem of calculating deficiency judgments. 
                                                                                                     
Because the two appraisers are unable to agree, they together select Appraiser 
C, who values the property at $7.8 million. As the middle appraisal of the three, 
Appraiser C’s valuation governs, and the appraised value will be $7.8 million, 
which corresponds to the outcome of the case.  
 324. According to the National Association of Realtors, there have been an 
estimated five million completed foreclosures nationwide since September 2008. 
Foreclosures Drop to Lowest Level Since Great Recession, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
REALTORS (May 30, 2014), http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-
news/2014/05/30/foreclosures-drop-lowest-level-great-recession (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Business schools 
have responded to recent accounts of former athletes falling into financial 
distress by creating specialized executive MBA programs for athletes. See Akane 
Otani, Basketball Star Who Went Bankrupt Wishes He’d Gotten an MBA, BUS. 
WK. (Oct. 23, 2014), www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-10-23/basketball-star-
who-went-bankrupt-wishes-hed-gotten-an-mba (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) 
(“Citing a report that about 60 percent of former NBA players go broke within 
five years of retirement, Walker says teaching athletes—no matter what sport 
they play—how to manage their own money is a good step in bringing the 
number of debt-ridden athletes down.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 325. See Vaughan, supra note 87, at 958 (“At any rate, the fact of this 
continuing struggle between the creditor and debtor is a primary consideration 
well to bear in mind.”); see also Warm, supra note 285, at 167 (“Where, in earlier 
days, it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were 
involved, and that those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has 
later been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly 
affected.”). 
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A foreclosure sale does not always make for complete 
justice.326 Most states allow a lender whose loan remains 
unsatisfied following foreclosure to seek recourse for the 
deficiency against its borrower’s other assets.327  
The traditional common law method for calculating 
deficiency judgments has been criticized by courts and 
commentators as unjust and overdue for reform.328 The fair value 
concept is the alternative most widely adopted and recommended 
by the Restatement.329 This approach is itself subject to criticism. 
First, although packaged as a restatement of law, it is in fact a 
proposal for law reform in almost half the states.330 Property law 
evolves at a glacial pace that frustrates advocates of reform; 
however, characterizing law reform as restatement creates 
uncertainty that threatens the persuasive precedential value of 
Restatements generally.331 Second, the fair value concept is 
hollow at its core. Proponents concede it is vague and 
subjective.332 It provides no meaningful guidance to triers of fact 
charged with adjudicating value.333 It is fair to assume that the 
                                                                                                     
 326. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 21, § 12:41 (describing the 
rights of senior parties during judicial foreclosure). 
 327. See Skilton, supra note 11, at 442 (stating that the lender can satisfy 
the personal judgment via the borrower’s other assets or levy against the 
mortgaged premises). 
 328. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (providing the chief 
criticisms against the traditional arithmetical method for calculating deficiency 
judgments). 
 329. See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text (describing the 
adoption of the fair value approach by states and through the Restatement). 
 330. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that, despite the 
Restatement’s urging, no state court has decided to adopt the fair value 
approach through the exercise of its equity jurisdiction).  
 331. In fairness, the American Law Institute, which has published 
Restatements since 1923, receives even more scholarly criticism for the 
perception that it is dominated by elitists and resistant to liberalization of the 
common law. See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The 
Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007); David A. Logan, 
When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the “Flagrant 
Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448 (2011).  
 332. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (revealing the reasoning 
behind the strong criticism against the fair value approach).  
 333. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Restatement’s drafters viewed uncertainty as the primarily weakness in the fair 
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fair value approach is designed to benefit debtors at the expense 
of creditors by generating uncertainty and encouraging 
settlement of cases that are emotionally fraught by their very 
nature, or by discouraging lenders from pursuing deficiency 
judgments entirely. 
Defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws impose transaction costs 
that adversely affect the availability of mortgage financing and 
real estate values.334 Fair value limitations in their current form 
benefit certain overburdened borrowers while a much larger 
category of nondefaulting borrowers may face a reduced supply of 
mortgage credit, and less favorable terms, at the time of loan 
origination.  
This Article recommends a more structured approach 
modeled after statutes in South Carolina and Louisiana.335 It 
would vest well qualified real estate appraisers with the quasi-
judicial function of determining value for purposes of calculating 
deficiency judgments. By incorporating the benefits of alternative 
dispute resolution and the experience of transactional practice, 
this approach will make the system of foreclosure more cost 
effective, expeditious, and equitable to both parties.  
                                                                                                     
value approach).  
 334. See supra notes 243–246 and accompanying text (elucidating the 
unintended consequences of defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws). 
 335. See supra Part V (describing the approach of Louisiana and South 
Carolina and how these approaches inform this Article’s  statutory proposal). 
